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ABSTRACT
This thesis places Florida's phosphate industry in the context of the New South and the
state's fitful emergence into modernity. Historian Paul Ortiz has identified a long trend of
“Florida exceptionalism” – the idea that Florida has been exempt from the conflicts characteristic
of the New South. These conflicts are rooted in racial violence and inconsistent industrialization,
which resulted in lagging wages, labor struggles, overproduction crises and sporadic capital
investment. These Southern trends are likewise rooted in a national narrative of modernization,
despite a tendency to consider the New South as in some sense outside of modernity.
I argue that Florida has not been exempt from the conflicts characteristic of the New
South or of modernity, and that the phosphate industry between 1900 and 1930 strikingly
demonstrates these conflicts. Florida phosphate mining was one of the most capitalized and
developed industries in Florida during these years; yet it has received essentially no attention
from historians working in the relevant historiographies of labor, race, mining technology and
political economy. In placing the industry into these contexts, the thesis proceeds analytically
rather than narratively, making the argument by examining the industry from three distinct, but
interrelated, perspectives, posed at increasing levels of generality: first, examining labor conflict
and interracial organization in the industry; second, examining competitive pressures and
technological change and third, examining the industry's vertical integration into the national
fertilizer market.
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INTRODUCTION
The phosphate industry in Florida developed in the 1890s after the discovery of
phosphate rich soils in and around Polk County in the preceding decade. Goaded on by an eager
local press, this early industry was characterized by its land speculation and propensity for
volatility, bankruptcies and mergers.1 After the dust of the early years had settled, what began
with dozens of potential mining companies had become concentrated and stable. As these
corporations grew in profitability due to both national and international demand, so too grew
their need for capital and labor. Given the rudimentary state of pebble mining technology, most
of the labor was unskilled; and, among the unskilled laborers, most workers were black.2 The
relationship between capital and labor during this period was tense, and reached its most visible
breaking point in a months-long strike in 1919.3
The phosphate industry came to prominence in Florida during the formative years that
boosters and historians alike have termed the “New South,” and it did so with a large, typically
black labor base and a protracted labor-capital opposition. This fits closely with wider trends in
the region. The New South, as a whole, has been characterized by its foremost historians as a
period of uneven industrialization and deepening racial segregation.4 Yet despite these

1

Arch Blakey, The Florida Phosphate Industry: A History of the Development and Use of a Vital Mineral
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), xxi.
2
Ibid., 57.
3
Jan Voogd, Race Riots & Resistance: The Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 73-75.
4
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951)
remains standard; Woodward characterized the New South as beholden to the economic interests of the Redeemers
and of an ascendant capitalist class. Picking up in the year that Woodward left off is George B. Tindall’s Emergence
of the South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 95, 125, 184, 319, encompasses the
other half of the period studied in this thesis. I find that the absence of an overarching theoretical framework gives
Tindall the ability to closely narrate the conflicts of the period in greater depth than any other New South historian;
his New South begins as Bryanite progressivism yields to a Wilsonian embrace of industry (“business
progressivism”), as social progressivism is diffused into the Prohibition movement. Having “deeply implanted the
idea of deliverance through industry,” the ‘20s simultaneously saw deepening segregation, credit shortages and
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correspondences, the Florida phosphate industry is almost wholly absent from the historiography
of the New South. This thesis will address the relationship between Florida’s phosphate industry
and these wider developments of the New South.
What the New South entails, and what phosphates’ role in it was, must first be clarified.
In The New South Creed, Paul Gaston identifies the myth of the New South as one that combined
the goal of “economic modernization” (the “New”) with a maintenance and reinforcement of
segregated racial practices (the “South”).5 For the early New South mythmakers this was to be a
functional harmony.6 Gaston finds, on the contrary, that this economic development and these
racial practices were far from harmonious. According to labor historian Henry McKiven, the
project of the New South carried as much threat to the repressive social order of the boosters as it
carried promise of harmony.7 Specifically, economic modernization entailed the creation of an
industrial labor force. This could ferment labor activism. And the racial composition of Southern
demographics posed an even greater worry to boosters.
The recurrent themes of the New South’s historiography (economic modernization,
urbanization, social conflict) are in many respects familiar beyond the region, and recur again
and again in histories of America’s struggle into modernity.8 Modernity as a historiographical
category designates the various and contingent, though often stark and violent, historical

“chronic distress” in agriculture, culminating in the Depression. The New South experienced at once “urban booms
and farm distress” and relied on, while being crippled by, its perpetually cheap labor markets.
5
Paul Gaston, The New South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking (New York: Knopf, 1970), 195.
6
Henry McKiven, Iron and Steel: Class, Race, and Community in Birmingham, Alabama, 1875- 1920 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1.
7
Ibid.
8
“Modernity” has long been a crucial historical and sociological category, associated since Max Weber with the
rationalization of production, centralization of politics and industry and increasing bureaucracy. Historical and
interpretive accounts of modernity important for this thesis Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1966); Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (New York and London: Verso Books,
1983) and Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
2011).
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processes of urbanization, commodification of labor, goods and services, integration into
national and world markets (with concomitant nationalisms and World Wars), monopolization of
capital, political centralization, racial tensions and technological change. This narrative is
commonly one of “agrarian” becoming “urban,” but this simplifies the dynamic of modernity
and industrial capitalism, which creates regions of “underdevelopment” in the same movement
that sees tremendous growth in wealth and industry. Historian Robert Wiebe aptly characterizes
the changes that took place throughout the 1890s and 1900s, finding economic centralization
married to dislocation, urbanization to disruption and the imposition of law to the legal sanction
of privilege.9 The boosters’ New South was a self-conscious attempt to reap the benefits of
modernity while rhetorically downplaying its difficulties. Halting, isolated attempts at industry,
and Jim Crow guaranteed that the difficulties of modernity were particularly acute in the South.
Within the historiography of the New South, there is a conspicuous scarcity of works on
Florida; historian Paul Ortiz has identified a persistent trend of “Florida exceptionalism,” the
image of Florida as set apart from the “racially oppressive Old South” and therefore not marked
by the conflicts of its neighboring states.10 Florida’s per-capita lynching rate, the highest in the
nation during this period, should dispel that myth.11 And to place Florida squarely within the
narrative and framework of the New South is to remove any vestiges of “exceptionalism” from
its history. I argue that Florida’s phosphate industry demonstrates that Florida was not exempt
from the inherently conflictual nature of modernity.

9

Wiebe, Search for Order, 27, 31, 77.
Paul Ortiz, "Afterward," in Irvin D. S. Winsboro, Old South, New South, or Down South?: Florida and the
Modern Civil Rights Movement (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2009), 221.
11
Ibid., 224. Florida enjoyed this distinction from 1882 to 1930.
10
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Structure and Historiography
This argument is made by examining three particular conflicts pervasive in the phosphate
industry and characteristic of the New South.12 These areas of tension are labor, technological
change and political economy. The chapters will examine each of these perspectives distinctly,
beginning with the local labor conflict of 1919; widening in scope to consider the intra-industry
dynamics of technological change and ending with inter-industry and regional economic
integration. In structuring the argument in this way, I intend to expand labor historian Brian
Kelly’s insistence on “bringing the employer back in,” or considering the agency of labor at the
local level alongside the structural constraints that become imposed upon actors at the level of
capital.13 In skeletal outline: low wages and twelve hour shifts precipitated labor organization
among the largely unskilled mine workers, an organization that cut across and negotiated the Jim
Crow color line. Despite initial federal involvement, the resulting strike was only resolved
grudgingly, with hours shortened and pay slightly increased. The industry was capital-intensive
and during the period rarely saw high profit margins, at times mining at a loss. Mine operators
were willing to halt production altogether rather than cede to labor’s demands, in part because
competition and overproduction had rendered higher labor costs deeply unpalatable to the
industry leaders. The economic imperatives that constrained the behavior of capital were a result
of regional and national market behavior, as the industry existed in a commodity chain integrated
into agriculture, the fertilizer and chemical industries. The capacity of the union to organize was

“Tensions” and “conflicts” can be translated into in the language of Marxist thought as essentially the question of
contradictions: for example, the contradiction between both an ostensibly de jure free labor force (legal right to sell
one's labor) and an actually de jure racial hierarchy; the contradiction between the drive for competitive production
and the relative declines in profitability; the contradiction between free market imperatives and the centralization of
production.
13
Brian Kelly, Race, Class and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-21 (Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2001), 9.
12
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also constrained by Jim Crow segregation, entrenched in law and white sentiment, and actively
manipulated by the industry against the union.
Southern phosphate mining has a sparse secondary literature. The only notable
monograph on Florida phosphate is Arch Blakey’s 1973 institutional history, The Florida
Phosphate Industry.14 Blakey's work is strictly narrative, avoiding questions of labor, race, or of
a larger New South context. More pressing work has been done on the phosphate industry in
South Carolina, explicitly connecting it to the development of the New South. The most valuable
of these, a recent monograph published by New South historian Shepherd McKinley, places
South Carolina’s phosphate mines squarely within the context of post-bellum racial antagonisms,
arguing for the significance of the early industry’s role in the creation of a viable black labor
force existing beyond the strictures of sharecropping.15 An earlier, far less sanguine, article
published by Don Doyle and Tom Shick connected the industry’s disappearance and failure with
the economic and social divisions endemic in the New South. Doyle and Shick argue that the
South Carolina phosphate industry experienced a “stillbirth” due to the inability of the upper
class to cope with either capital-driven entrepreneurial demands or with the challenge of
recruiting a sufficient amount of wage laborers.16
Given the centrality of labor in the industry’s confrontations with the problems of race
and economic change, the first chapter of the thesis is staged as a contribution to labor history.
This chapter draws on two aspects of American labor history: the concept of “industrial
14

Blakey, The Florida Phosphate Industry. Given that this thesis is organized analytically rather than narratively, it
presupposes the unimpeachable (if limited) narrative history given by Blakey – as such, it is recommended to
consult Blakey’s work for this narrative.
15
Shepherd McKinley, Stinking Stones and Rocks of Gold: Phosphate, Fertilizer, and Industrialization in
Postbellum South Carolina (Gainseville: University Press of Florida, 2014), 8.
16
Don Doyle and Tom Shick, “The South Carolina Phosphate Boom and the Stillbirth of the New South, 18671920,” The South Carolina Historical Magazine 86 (January 1985), 4. Doyle and Shick credit “Afro-American
resistance to the wage labor market” for this difficulty.
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democracy” and of interracial unionism, and attempts to bring these ideas into conversation. The
question is whether the demand for World War I-era industrial democracy was hindered or
helped by the racially egalitarian organizational stance of the industry’s WWI-era union, the
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (known commonly as Mine-Mill).17
Interracial unionism became a prominent topic in the historiography due to an essay
published by Herbert Gutman in 1968 on the letters of black labor organizer Richard L. Davis.
The debate that ensued must be rehearsed. Gutman expressed the possibility of a genuine
interracial spirit among in the United Mine Workers and asked that more work be done on the
matter.18 Two decades later, labor historian Herbert Hill took strong issue with the essay, arguing
that uncritical acceptance of the rhetoric of the union organizers will blind historians to the far
more divisive racial realities underlying them and dictating union policy.19 Although their
positions are more nuanced, the “Gutman-Hill debate” became shorthand for the
historiographical argument regarding the very possibility of interracial unionism.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s works by Daniel Letwin, Brian Kelly and Robert
Woodrum revisited the Gutman-Hill debate. Writing within a decade of each other and actively
engaged in conversation, Letwin, Kelly and Woodrum provide a natural point from which
discussion of Florida’s Mine-Mill policies can be broached. All three historians look to the coal
mining unions of Alabama (primarily, the UMW, the object of the Gutman-Hill debate) in the
first decades of the 20th century. Letwin offers support for Gutman’s hope to find class solidarity

Joseph McCartin, Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern
American Labor Relations, 1912-1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 12.
18
Herbert G. Gutman, “The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America, the Career and Letters of Richard L.
Davis and Something of Their Meaning: 1890-1900,” in The Negro and the American Labor Movement, edited by
Julius Jacobson (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), 49-127.
19
Herbert Hill, “Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers of America,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2 (Winter 1988), 133.
17
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trumping racial division in even a limited way by examining closely the moments that miners
were able to separate wage and labor-related issues from the everyday experience of racial caste,
which went largely unchallenged. Kelly in part suspends the debate to consider the composition
and internal conflicts among Alabama’s black UMW miners. Rather than rehashing the whiteblack labor dichotomy, Kelly finds that among black workers themselves there was a significant
division between middle class, reconciliatory, conservative black workers and a much smaller
group of radical or militant workers. Woodrum, writing after Kelly, partly echoes Letwin, and
draws a useful “underground-aboveground” distinction, which was particularly operative in the
1920s. This distinction allowed for practices evincing racial solidarity to be engaged in
“underground,” that is, in the mines, but go ignored or violated while in the segregated, Jim
Crow space of the “aboveground.”20
The historiography of mining technology offers only blank pages on the developments of
phosphate mining after 1900. From the perspective of the history of technology, the industry
provides a chance to examine the relationship between technological change and the economic
dynamics that provide the framework that either enables or inhibits the development of
technology. This includes intra-industry competition, world-market competition and opposition
between labor and capital.21 Robert Woodrum provides a salient example of conflict between
labor and technological change: interracial labor practices in Alabama were severely undercut by
the process of technological unemployment, which favored white workers for the increasingly

Robert Woodrum, “Everybody Was Black Down There”: Race and Industrial Change in the Alabama Coalfields
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2007), 11.
21
Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 26-27.
Wallerstein discusses the mechanisms of competition and monopolization and their influence on technology and
profitability in detail throughout his oeuvre.
20
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skilled division of labor.22
The most immediately relevant subfield within the history of technology is the
historiography of American mining technology. The field was most active between the mid1980s to the mid-1990s. Three works highlighting the unique manner in which capitalist
development affects or determines technological change merit notice. In Hard Rock Epic, Mark
Wyman argues that the contingencies of capital structure, geography and labor organization resist
and influence the implementation of mining technology. This argument is developed by Ronald
Eller, who also places this technological change within a wider Southern economic context.
Technological change is no guarantee of economic progress, and can instead bring with it
underdevelopment, decreased wages and deskilling harmful to labor, if these are beneficial to
capital.23 The impact of these changes specifically on mining labor are explored by Keith Dix.
Dix introduces the concept of “labor process” and workplace control, and examines strategies
deployed by management to use technology specifically to undermine the workers’ ability to
control the pace or magnitude of work.24 These arguments bear on similar changes that occurred
in phosphate mining.
The historiography relevant to the third chapter falls loosely under “political economy”
and the phosphate industry’s place within the broader New South economic landscape. The
industry was marked by a turn toward rapid monopolization due to recklessly competitive
overproduction. Is the industry’s development typical of New South political economy, or do
certain conditions render it atypical (as compared to mining and other rapidly modernizing

Woodrum, “Everybody…,” 55.
Ronald Eller, Miners, Millhands, Mountaineers: Industrialization of the Appalachian South (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1982), xxvi, 119, 84-87.
24
Keith Dix, What's a Coal Miner to Do?: The Mechanization of Coal Mining (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1989), 139.
22
23
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industries)? This is answered with reference not only to the works of New South political
economy, but also to works that explore more widely the institutional history of industrial growth
and monopolization during this period.25
The historiography of the political economy of the New South spans decades, but the
most relevant works for this thesis begin with the synthesis provided in James C. Cobb’s
Industrialization and Southern Society.26 Cobb sets the tone by casting the New South as
economically stagnant due to its delay in sufficiently capitalizing agriculture or developing
infrastructure. Cobb and the historians following him are united in their attempt to understand
the uneven and delayed regional development of a modernized industrial economy in the postbellum South. Gavin Wright, perhaps the most notable of recent New South economic historians,
considers the stagnation of industrial development from the perspective of the Southern labor
market, which he argues was distinctively low wage in an otherwise high wage national
economy.27 This was due to the available labor opportunities being overwhelmingly agricultural,
which created a downward pressure on wages for all other economic sectors. When
industrialization did occur, it did so in relatively isolated pockets that ultimately could not
reverse the uniformly low wage of the Southern labor market. Although this low wage labor
market meant that labor was cheap relative to capital, it also meant that the robust level of
consumption necessary for economic growth could not take hold. In their individual and jointly
authored works, economic and New South historians David Carlton and Peter Coclanis argue

25

Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap
Press), 1977 and Naomi Lameroux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988) are two of the most visible examples of this approach.
26
James C. Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society 1877-1984 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1984), 11.
27
Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York:
Basic Books, 1986), among Wright’s other works on Southern economy.
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that industrial development was also hampered by the region’s reliance on technologies and
skillsets that had to be imported.28 Even if there was capital available to develop industry, it
could not become self-sustaining as the knowledge and machinery was not locally available.
Industrial jobs were thus typically confined to low skill, low wage work that reinforced the
problems of the labor market.29 Access to capital was also limited by a weak investment
infrastructure.
More recently, Scott Marler’s The Merchant’s Capital reemphasizes the theme of
stagnation, going so far as to argue that until the New Deal, aside from small pockets of
industrial capital the New South remained fundamentally non-capitalist. Marler’s argument
hinges on his theoretically sophisticated epilogue that engages with and provides a bridge to
works using Marxist and world-systems theory approaches to political economy.30 Although I
take issue Marler’s characterization of the New South, I draw on similar resources in my
argument, particularly on the works of economist Anwar Shaikh and historian Giovanni Arrighi;
their concepts of capitalism are in many respects congruent, and share an adherence to a
macroeconomic theory grounded in the imperatives of profitability and the accumulation of
capital.31 Their insistence on the dynamic and destabilizing effects of competition are more
useful in explaining industrial instability, overproduction and imbalances in supply and demand
than are neoclassical approaches to economics, which presuppose equilibrium models of perfect

28

David Carlton and Peter Coclanis, The South, the Nation, and the World: Perspectives on Southern Economic
Development (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003) , 73-98.
29
Ibid.
30
Scott P. Marler, The Merchants’s Capital: New Orleans and the Political Economy of the Nineteenth-Century
South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 257-282. In a sense, Marler is rehearsing the career-long
arguments of Eugene Genovese, who often insisted on the non-bourgeois and non-capitalist nature of the South.
31
Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (New York and London: Verso Books, 1994) and Anwar Shaikh,
Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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competition.32 Shaikh and Arrighi explain crises and conflicts as endogenous to the functioning
of industrial capitalism; Shaikh does so by drawing out the consequences “real competition” and
Arrighi by drawing on the theme of asymmetric development, which sees growth and
underdevelopment as endogenous to the accumulation process.33 Given the New South’s vexing
appearance, with pockets of urbanization and industrialization amidst sprawling rural
“backwardness,” an approach that sees both as consequences of an economic and historical
process of modernization is exceedingly valuable.
The approach that Shaikh takes in understanding capitalism offers a strong conceptual
corrective to histories of economics that share the presuppositions of orthodox, neoclassical
models. In doing so, he joins into a heterodox tradition within economics that is more interested
in instability than stability, crises than perfect functioning; this line draws back from Joseph
Schumpeter and Robert Heilbroner to Marx and David Ricardo. Instead of modeling capitalism
and economic behavior as guided by universal rational norms, and seeing instability and crises as
aberration resulting from extra-economic causes, Shaikh insists that these “non-perfect” features
are intrinsic to the functioning of capitalism, which is driven to by profitability, capital
accumulation and real competition – actual firms undercutting, overproducing, monopolizing to
drive competitors out and achieve monopoly prices, in historically specific situations and
markets. Given a noted divorce that has occurred between narrative economic history and
economic theory, and the divorce between supposedly ahistorical models of economic rationality
and perfect competition and the messiness and “irrationality” of actual historical events, this
This theory is broadly derived from Marx’s argument regarding the centrality of profit and the falling rate of profit
in Capital, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1981). It is also developed in Moishe Postone, Time,
Labor and Social Domination: A Re-Interpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996) and Guglielmo Carchedi, The Frontiers of Political Economy (New York and London: Verso Books,
1992).
33
Shaikh, Capitalism, 259-321.
32
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heterodox approach offers much to historians.34 Moreover, the importance of understanding
conflict endogenously has more far reaching historical consequences, and is seen at different
scales in all of the following chapters.

Conclusion
If Robert Wiebe can be taken as the exemplary proponent of the concepts of modernity
and modernization in American history, then a critique of him offered by historian Kenneth
Cmiel warrants some consideration, especially since these critiques echo the theses on conflict
discussed above.35 Cmiel recites the modernization thesis formulated by Max Weber and
considers how closely Wiebe adheres to it. Cmiel argues that despite his pessimistic tone, Wiebe
is guilty of downplaying conflict (particularly economic conflict between classes, and racial
conflict) and, moreover, refusing to see conflict as part of the process of modernization itself,
and not as an aberration or epiphenomenon.36
The task is to think of modernity not as the stable endpoint reached after the resolution of
conflicts, even if this stable endpoint itself is cast in the pessimistic terms of Weber (the iron
cage of rationality) or Wiebe; likewise, not to think of this progress toward rationalization or
order as necessary or inevitable one, which reduces conflicts to epiphenomena. The “search for
order” cannot be understood apart from the patterns of disorder intrinsic to that very search.
This thesis contributes to this task by holding fast to the idea that conflict is endogenous
to the process of modernization, that modernity is defined by the instability and conflicts that
Jeremy Adelman and Jonathan Levy, “The Fall and Rise of Economic History,” The Chronicle of Higher
Education (Dec. 1, 2014): accessed March 7, 2016, URL: http://chronicle.com/article/The-FallRise-ofEconomic/150247/
35
Kenneth Cmiel, “Destiny and Amnesia: The Vision of Modernity in Robert Wiebe's The Search for Order The
Search for Order by Robert Wiebe,” Reviews in American History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 357.
36
Ibid.
34
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took place, and that the South most clearly displays this convoluted process of “amelioration on
the one hand and heightened tension on the other.”37 This is done by focusing on one state,
Florida, and providing three linked analyses of conflict typical of modernity. Labor and race,
industry and technology, integration and monopolization; each of these aspects analyzed within
the industry display the conflictual logic of modernity.

The quote is from Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 150 – Tindall is describing the conditions of black
migrants arriving in the North during the Great Migration, but the phrase is widely applicable.
37
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CHAPTER ONE
RACE AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
The topic of interracial unionism has occupied the historiography of American labor
since its rebirth in the 1970s and 1980s. Daniel Letwin’s The Challenge of Interracial Unionism
– a seminal work of this New Labor History – narrates the United Mine Workers' attempts to
organize across racial lines in Jim Crow Alabama’s coal fields.1 Letwin found that due to the
racial composition of the miners, an exclusion of black laborers in the union would have
amounted to certain defeat.2 But Letwin also notes that if the public thought the UMW sought
“social equality” between the races, it would have been equally disastrous.3 The UMW, like
other interracial Southern labor unions of the period, had to find a specific means to organize
across racial lines “without perishing in a frontal assault” from those who refused to see
segregation effaced.4
The racial demographics and low-skilled work of those coal miners is strikingly mirrored
in another, far more neglected mining industry: the pebble phosphate mines in Central Florida.
Although demographics and a low skill threshold contributed to the Alabama UMW’s successful
organization in the 1920s, these factors do not necessarily entail the success of interracial
unionism. From the early years of the 1900s until the middle of the First World War, Florida's
phosphate miners were unable to found a lasting union or to mount large-scale demands of their
employers. This changed only in the last years of the First World War, when the International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers took notice of the region. The local unions formed
under the direction of Mine-Mill were able to organize and to bring demands to the National War
1

Daniel Letwin, The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878-1921 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
2
Ibid., 130.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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Labor Board in late 1918. In 1919, after the mining companies refused to comply with NWLBapproved demands, Mine-Mill mounted a seven month strike. The Mine-Mill Union, like the
UMW, was faced with the challenge of finding a means to publicly negotiate the terms of Jim
Crow while still pursuing the goals of interracial organization.
I argue that it was war-time industrial democracy that provided the framework that
enabled interracial organization during Mine-Mill’s 1918-1919 efforts in Florida’s phosphate
mines. According to labor historian Joseph McCartin, two crucial components of industrial
democracy were the active mediation of the federal government in labor conflicts and the wartime language of “working class Americanism.”5 The Florida Mine-Mill efforts exemplify this
approach. Federal mediation and patriotic language allowed Mine-Mill to maintain the rigidity of
the Jim Crow color line while nevertheless challenging mine operators in the interest of a
common cause.
This chapter also draws on Henry McKiven Jr.'s Iron and Steel, which argues that class
identities are always crucially mediated by constructions of race.6 However, the pessimistic
conclusions McKiven takes from this are demonstrated to be specific to the circumstances of the
iron and steel district he studied. The demographic conditions of the phosphate mines, the greater
uniformity of the labor and the framework provided by industrial democracy gave a sounder
basis to Mine-Mill's interracial organization. But McKiven gives a stark reminder that neither
pole of interracial unionism – class or race – can be ignored.
Industrial labor organization and Jim Crow are both products of modernity that share its
conflictual logic. It is easy to separate industrial organization and the modern creation of the
Joseph McCartin, Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern
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color line into progressive and regressive elements of modernity, but the harder task is to
understand this disparity together, as moments of a wider narrative.7 This narrative of modernity
invariably includes the First World War, the global background of the labor conflict occurring in
Polk County.
The chapter draws primarily from two bodies of primary sources, which reflect the two
defining moments of Mine-Mill’s efforts in the region. The first is the series of interviews
conducted December of 1918 with the National War Labor Board in Tampa. This was the stage
on which Mine-Mill sought to gain legitimacy for the union in the eyes of the government and
mine operators. The latter, however, refused to concede to either the union or to the National
War Labor Board. The response from Mine-Mill was a strike. The strike, which spanned seven
months between April and December of 1919, is the second pivotal moment for this period.8 The
sources for the strike come from the commentary of local and state newspapers contemporary
with the event. A difficulty of this chapter stems from the fact that the union, though heavily
staffed by black workers, is represented by white members of Mine-Mill. Although the very
organization of the union points to the active drive and patient work on the ground by black
workers, the sources give little insight into their everyday goals or tactics. The difficulty of
extrapolating from the experiences and histories of other Florida labor organizations also bears
stressing. For the period, Mine-Mill’s interracial practice was almost completely unique. Much
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more typical were the segregated policies of craft unions such as the Florida State Federation of
Labor.9

Industrial democracy
Joseph McCartin introduced “industrial democracy” as a category of analysis into
American labor history with his book Labor’s Great War. McCartin looked at the activity of a
number of unions during the First World War, arguing that previous labor historians had
neglected the centrality of the federal government in mediating labor conflict. This mediation
was enabled by the newly established federal bureau that oversaw labor conflict – what would
become the National War Labor Board. McCartin’s definition of industrial democracy was
deliberately expansive. This allowed him to incorporate within it a number of related phenomena
while retaining the modern state and the First World War as centers of gravity. More narrowly,
industrial democracy entailed the use of a rhetoric he terms “working class Americanism,” the
reliance on the active mediation of the federal government and the workplace demand for a
degree of regularity in labor.
“Working class Americanism,” was a political language that presented labor demands in
terms that were sympathetic to the war effort and patriotic in tone. This was a response to the
contentious role of labor organization during the First World War. During the war, the threat of
being labeled a Bolshevik or being cast as un-American loomed large. The importance of federal
mediation was most evident in those cases in which the National War Labor Board played a part.
As McCartin notes, this was a reflection of the increasing regulatory power of the Wilson
9
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administration, and of the growth of the federal government during the Progressive period.10 The
demand for regularity in the workplace is framed in contrast to historian David Montgomery’s
emphasis on workplace control. McCartin finds that workplace control is not a universal standard
for labor demands. In the context he examines, and particularly in low-skilled work, the demand
was simply for a predictable and non-arbitrary “rule of law” in the workplace, free from the
caprice of management. This tied into the idea that the workplace, if not controlled by workers,
should reflect the patriotic values espoused as wartime values; America being free and fair, the
workplace should follow suit.
The language of working class Americanism was steeped in the rhetoric of patriotism and
pro-war nationalism. It was typically anti-German but eventually became anti-Bolshevik and
anti-anarchist. This concept comes initially from labor historian Gary Gerstle, who narrates its
emergence as a political language in response to the wartime Americanization efforts, the
centralization of industry and the influence of mass culture.11 When adopted, this political
language could differ wildly in its aims: used as readily for traditionalist as for as democratic and
progressive ends. It is its democratic manifestation that is most relevant here, and Gerstle charts
how the concepts of democracy, liberty and rights came to be adopted as tropes used in
formulating political and organizational goals.12
Mine-Mill’s phosphate union spoke in a language that was at once democratic, patriotic
and nationalistic. This manifested first in the private space of the National War Labor Board
hearings, before spilling into the public sphere during the strike. There the debate was waged
between supporters of the union and mining companies over which group represented American
McCartin, Labor’s Great War, 4-6.
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interests. By repeatedly insisting on the pro-war, pro-American interests of the union, Mine-Mill
attempted to circumvent the presentation of its organizational aims as at all subversive.
Mine-Mill’s working class Americanism operated with a number of distinct rhetorical
tactics. The first was used exclusively during the NWLB hearings. There union representatives
emphasized that Mine-Mill successfully prevented a strike of the workers. This was used to
maintain that the union had the interests of the nation first, given that phosphate had been
classified as a war essential industry by the War Industries Board, and the Board forbade the
striking of such industries.13
The order from the union officials was that that union members were to “not allow any
strikes by any means” and to wait for and ultimately “abide by the decision of the War Labor
Board.”14 This was then presented in the language of industrial democracy: that however
deplorable working conditions may have been, strikes were forbidden by the union because the
miners were to be “first patriots as long as this war lasted, and then straight union men.”15 A
worker at the Charleston Mining and Manufacturing Company agreed with Mine-Mill
representative Edward Crough: it was a matter of putting the workers’ “patriotism first and your
trade unionism second.”16 And, when workers at the Prairie Phosphate Company attempted a
three day strike, the union immediately acted to end it, stating that they must, “stay on the job as
long as the country is at war.”17
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Throughout the NWLB hearings, related tactics were pursued, all aimed at affirming the
patriotic interests of the workers in contrast with the avaricious behavior of the mine operators.18
It was repeatedly stated to the NWLB that workers across a number of the companies accepted a
wage cut in 1914 in the interest of maintaining the war effort.19 Mine operators, facing warrelated shortages, cut wages by as much as 25%; interviewees stressed that this was suffered
stoically by the workers, sacrificing self-interest in favor of patriotism.20
Similarly the fight over the reduction of labor hours was framed in patriotic terms. The
demand was to shorten hours from the standard 10 or 12 (depending on the work being done) to
a consistent 8 hours of per day. Crough justified the demand for 8 hours as arising not merely
from the harsh conditions of the work, but from the fact that an 8 hour day was the properly
American thing to do: not only insofar as it had become the industry standard for mining
throughout the country (he claimed), but more specifically because fair hours were a means of
distinguishing the labor of America from its autocratic wartime enemies.21 Crough stated that
even in Germany, a country ruled by a Kaiser, the miners were worked less harshly than in the
phosphate district.22 Here Crough made the implicit connection between the autocracy of the
mine operators and the autocracies in Europe into an explicit critique.23 When the mine operators
attempted bribery or intimidation of the workers, this too was likened to the policies of a Kaiser

As used here and throughout the thesis, “mine operators” refers to the companies owning and operating the
phosphate mines – that is, capital as opposed to labor. This term was common in primary sources.
19
Docket 680 Record Group 2, Records of the National War Labor Board, National Archives, College Park,
Maryland, 23.
20
Docket 680 76; Docket 680 File A Record Group 2, Records of the National War Labor Board, National
Archives, College Park, Maryland, 8-9.
21
Docket 680, 36.
22
Docket 691, 39.
23
Docket 682, 16.
18

20

or despot.24 This claim would then be taken outside of the labor hearings and into the public,
where striking miners were able to present their case to the press – one of the first articles
produced during the strike openly pleaded, “help us win against the autocrats of the phosphate
mine.”25
The low wages and the inevitable debts taken on by employees at the Palmetto Phosphate
Company were disdainfully likened to conditions in Mexico, “where men are forced into such
peonage.”26 Palmetto’s policies are wont to bring on similar “dissension” and “war” as is found
in Mexico, as they were enslaving their men, Crough argued, by virtue of the fact that they
consistently underpaid them while lending out future pay to workers at steep interest rates.27
Mine-Mill’s moral argument is clear. This debt placed workers in a state equivalent to feudalism,
to the labor of “four or five hundred years ago;” conditions which have no place for the “most
progressive people” of the United States.28 Industrial democracy meant that the fruits of
industrial labor should be shared with the workers; that the principles of democracy and freedom
touted as patriotic for the sake of war ought to be considered equally essential for labor.
Legal intimations rather than moral exhortations were made in the hearings for the
International Agricultural Company. Crough noted that the company primarily exported their
phosphate to Germany prior to the war. When the war broke out, it is asserted that IAC
continued their dealings without regard for possible illegality.29 By connecting the IAC to illegal
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dealings with Germany, the aim was to undermine the legitimacy of the mine operators by
associating them with America’s wartime foe.
In the presentation of the 1919 strike to the public additional tactics were adopted.
Foremost among them was the use of the NWLB’s verdict in favor of the union as a rhetorical
trope to justify the strike to the public. In doing so, the workers were also able to condemn the
companies as therefore being anti-American, in that they refused to acknowledge the authority of
the federal government. During the strike, controlling the discourse of patriotism became a far
more difficult task, as mine operators and their sympathizers took part in claiming the mantle of
Americanism for themselves. One newspaper contributor, under the pseudonym Vox Populi,
openly mocked the use of patriotic discourse by labor activists in Tampa, implying that their
patriotism was a phony guise for “Debsite” radicalism.30
Alongside the prevalence of “working class Americanism,” the most conspicuous aspect
of industrial democracy was the unprecedented mediatory role that the federal government took
in arbitrating labor conflict. Mine-Mill recognized early on that success would depend on the
union’s ability to prevent immediate action in favor of a longer term approach that would
culminate in the recognition of the union’s demands by the federal government. That the union’s
strategy relied on this appeal to the NWLB stands as strong evidence that Mine-Mill’s organizing
efforts would have been squelched far earlier had they not received the support of the federal
government.
Negative proof of the significance of federal intervention was offered by the extent to
which that mine operators resisted it. Prior to the hearings, the NWLB contacted the International
Agricultural Company asking for their presence. In response, IAC stated flatly that the company
30
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would not be present, as it “will not submit to the jurisdiction of your Board.”31 The response
from the NWLB was equally firm – the company’s defiance would certainly “not prevent the
Board’s proceeding with the case in regular order.”32
No company management was ever present during the hearings. A single lawyer, A. C.
Turner, representing all of the mine operators, was there to insist on the uniform rejection by the
mine operators of the idea that they must offer themselves up to a federal hearing. 33
The role played by the NWLB during the hearings was firm, almost aggressive. This was
illustrated by one of the more contentious moments during the hearings. While interviewing the
Phosphate Mining Company, one of the interviewees employed at this mine was revealed to have
been fired due to his attendance at the hearing.34 This employee attempted numerous times to tell
his superiors that he would be absent from work. The supervisors and mine operators obstinately
refused to accept the validity of his absence.35 The NWLB representatives were incensed. They
demanded from Turner that the employee be immediately reinstated – Turner deferred
responsibility on to the mine operators, who communicated that they had no knowledge of a
valid reason for absence.36 The exchange led again to Turner flatly asserting that the NWLB had
no authority over the hiring or firing of company employees.37 It was during this dispute that
Crough offered the memorable challenge to company authority, “if they want hell in that district,
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they are liable to have it amongst the men.”38 In a result that ultimately trumped the company’s
resistance, the employee was reinstated.39
Although only a single scene, the drama resulted from the conflict of union, company and
federal interests. This conflict was borne of the expanding regulatory reach and power of the
Wilson administration and the large companies that this regulation was beginning to affect.
These tensions were hardly reserved to the Tampa office where the NWLB hearings were
conducted. As the strike broke out in late April 1919, this took the public sphere as its stage.
However, two central characters were added into an already tense situation: the interests of the
local governments and state government, the latter represented by the extravagant Democratic
governor Sidney Catts.
The strategy adopted by the mine operators was to deny their consent that the NWLB be
allowed to arbitrate the dispute. The lawyer representing the mine operators to The Tampa
Tribune stated simply that “there is no war labor board committee in the phosphate region.”40 By
doing this, the NWLB were themselves largely powerless to act, needing the consent of both
parties.41 Despite the position of the mine operators, Mine-Mill continued to utilize the authority
of the NWLB to justify and communicate their position publicly.42
Mine-Mill secretary V. Urquhart stood out as the most outspoken public voice for the
workers.43 Urquhart’s visibility came at a price. In a direct illustration of the conflict existing
between the County Sherriff’s office (which was cast by Mine-Mill during the NWLB hearings
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as being complicit with the mine operators) and the workers, County Sherriff John Logan
arrested Urquhart for his alleged role in the assault of a contractor hired to work at one of the
mines.44 The scene on the ground primarily saw the conflict between workers and the gunmen
and deputies affiliated with the mine operators. Violence in the surrounding communities during
the strike was common. In August shots were fired into the town of Mulberry by guards
employed by the mine operators, killing two and injuring one – both fatalities were black
residents of the town.45
Governor Catts began to openly throw his support behind the striking miners, saying not
only that “their cause is just” but going so far as to claim that if the mine operators refused to
recognized their terms he would look into the possibility that he could “revoke their charters” for
mining in the state.46 Catts would continue to play a role in the conflict between the union and
mine operators. Industrial democracy was not confined to the arbitration of the federal
government: the intervention of the state government at the urging of a demagogic Democratic
governor is hardly less illustrative. This included an effort by the governor to mobilize county
guards to stop the increasingly hostile “gun play” breaking out as a result of the strike.47 Perhaps
the most contentious confrontation between the state and local governments came when
Governor Catts acted to remove the Polk County Sherriff John Logan and replace him with
Langford, a new sheriff – an action that would be met with overwhelming public disapproval at
the local level. But Logan had long been recognized by Mine-Mill as acting openly in the
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interests of the mine operators – even deputizing gunmen hired by IAC in the period before the
NWLB hearings.48

Interracial unionism
The critical historiographical debate for the New Labor History was that which occurred
between Gutman and Hill over the possibility of a genuine interracial solidarity in the
organization of Alabama’s UMW. Never resolved but only qualified and retrenched this debate
has continued to reverberate into the contemporary historiography of interracial unionism. But as
the debate echoes, it does so with a distinct Alabama accent. The peculiarities of Alabama’s
UMW are largely taken for granted, and theses regarded the possibility or impossibility of
interracial unionism are extrapolated without due regard for the specificity of their subject. A
slightly different pictures arises when the question is taken to Florida workers of this period, not
only in the phosphate fields but even in the cigar factories of Tampa, the latter providing a
strikingly different manifestation of interracial unionism.49
The interracial organization of Tampa cigar workers offers a precedent and a contrast
with the interracial strategies of Mine-Mill. The similarities are relatively few. The differences
derive from the fact that the work was considered skilled, and demanded the particular talents of
those well trained in the craft. Moreover, the racial composition of the labor differed radically
from that of the phosphate mines; most of the workers were white and Hispanic, largely Cuban.
Here, the language of Jim Crow was far less applicable for the simple fact that the employers and
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the employees represented a similar racial composition.50 What the phosphate miners of Florida
shared with the miners of Alabama rather than with the cigar workers of Tampa was that their
fight was cast across the color line.
Interracial unionism turns on the distinction made between the class identity and racial
identities of the workers. Once that distinction is made, those identities may be found to be
ultimately insurmountable, negligible, or even beneficial for organizing in the segregated South.
McKiven provides a useful and explicit discussion of this distinction. For McKiven, racial
identities are the distinct social identities formed by workers “in their neighborhoods, their
recreational activities, their organizations, and their politics.”51 But his argument continues,
noting too that “obvious racial division may, however, obscure sharp class differences within the
dominant and subordinate race.”52 Skilled white workers, despite the advantages they gained
from their race and position, knew that white capitalists could easily replace them with black
workers. To retain their economic position, they deployed the color line; this “class” interest fed
into racial subordination.53 Although this makes class interests primary, it does so in a way that
fundamentally reverses the optimism of Gutman. Rather than provide an opportunity for
solidarity, the primacy of class assured the fixity of inequality.
Similar arguments Barbara J. Fields can be used to expand on McKiven. McKiven found
skilled workers using racial language and racial violence as methods of cementing the privilege
some white workers derived from their skilled positions. Fields radicalizes this point, arguing
that race appends economic and social dominance. Fields critiques the primacy of racial identity
in understanding this conflict, arguing that because race always appends economic and social
50
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dominance, it cannot be considered apart from the historically specific patterns of dominance
that it is born in. Fields argues that the danger of examining race in terms of identity is that it
threatens to ignore that this identity must first be imposed. The color line is an imposition, used
to give purely social inequality a seemingly natural fixity, cementing privilege (such as skilled
jobs) with violence. The “color line” certainly exists; but Fields argues that viewing the color
line as an effect of “race” threatens to reify the category instead of understanding race
exclusively as a means of cementing social and economic dominance and conflict. She quotes W.
E. B. Du Bois, that to be black is simply to be “a person who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia.”54
By which she means that racial identity is necessarily affixed to social domination or
subordination, it does not explain it. This point can be extended to Florida: black workers are
those that must live in the segregated houses, and work the unskilled jobs. But consideration of
identity is needed, so long as this means recounting the daily reality of living with the color line,
of negotiating, challenging and subverting it. This is the point that David Roediger makes, in
avowed debt to Fields. 55 Roediger and Fields share an interest in the shifting deployment of the
color line as a means of social domination and control. It is necessary to examine how race was
used, how the color line was drawn, in order to cement, undermine or negotiate historically
specific social and economic situations. The color line is persistent, but is drawn over and over.
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But where, and how, it is drawn, depends fundamentally of the very specific social and economic
context of black and white workers.56
Identity or imposition, race and the color line ultimately are lived realities that are formed
through the everyday actions of the workers. That race exists for workers “in their
neighborhoods” is a central concern of the chapter. The remainder of this chapter investigates the
question of the color line as it was seen by the union members and mine operators, as presented
in the evidence of the NWLB hearings and the public reception of the strike. In doing so, it will
be possible to determine whether the union organizers were able to surmount the pervasive
conflict at the heart of race in the New South, organizing white and black workers across the
color line and despite the long shadow cast by Jim Crow.

Living conditions along the color line
For the members of the union, the fact of the color line presented itself in tangible, daily
terms. The color line as imposition was most visible in the sight of the company houses provided
for black workers. In every NWLB interview, union representatives were asked questions
regarding company housing, and these questions, whether they were guided by Crough or by
NWLB representatives, invariably led to questions regarding the living conditions of the black
workers. The living conditions of the black workers were abominable, with meager sanitation,
garbage, poorly constructed houses, negligent (if not wholly nonexistent) medical care, often no
schools, limited access to transportation and much else that presented a picture of disdain and
56
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neglect on the part of the company officials, whose task it was to furnish and look after these
houses. At every mine, there was white housing – itself miserable, although typically far less so
– and then there was colored housing, separated geographically by as little as 100 yards, but
socially, occupying an utterly different world.
The limits of the primary source material is felt strongly here: nearly all of the explicit
descriptions of race came in terms of the living conditions of black workers, which were
described by white workers with an ambivalent mixture of disgust and empathy. The empathy
came in terms that depicted the interests of black workers in contradiction to those of the mine
operators, although not necessarily as aligned with the interests of white workers.
Mine-Mill representative and American Cyanmid Company employee Russell put it
bluntly in an early hearing, “the colored houses are rotten.”57 At the American Cyanmid mines
they were found to be submerged in water that ran over from the mining pits and from the
sewage that is given no place to drain. Pools of water surrounded the houses.58 The number of
houses that could be present at a mine varied widely depending on the company. One of the
smaller groups of company housing, provided by the Phosphate Mining Company in Lakeland,
offered only ten white houses and six “colored” houses.59 Here the black workers’ housing was
described as being simply “shacks stuck up here and yon on the property.”60 Meanwhile, at the
Phosphate Mining Company mine in Nichols, there were as many as 45 “colored” houses
provided by the company.61 The conditions here too were described as being execrable. While
whites were provided for with basic sanitation and garbage disposal, among the black workers’
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houses there was no place to dispose of trash. Garbage collected in the areas around the houses to
such an extent that “you couldn’t walk.”62 No toilets of any sort were provided, barring the black
workers themselves digging “a hole in the bank” for that use.63 The houses leaked in the rain and
were consistently wet; they were surrounded by pools of standing water that was partially from
the mines and partially runoff from sewage.64 This unsurprisingly had the effect that there was a
constant threat and presence of illness among black workers and their families in the company
houses.65 The union member who testified for the workers at the Phosphate Mining Company,
Sutherland, presented these descriptions of the black workers from a perspective that seemed
initially empathetic. However, the complexities of race relations became manifest when this
same worker announced that much of his knowledge of the conditions of the workers derived
from the fact that he had been earlier been appointed by the deputy sheriff for the purpose of
patrolling the black houses.66 Sutherland was tasked with policing black workers at their homes
for the express intent that they did not “raise the roof off the house at night.”67 Even moments of
seeming solidarity, as in the indignation over the living conditions of black workers, is
complicated by the framework of Jim Crow – indignation can coexist with a superiority sense of
respectability, reifying an imposed condition into a measure of character.
White union representatives were comfortable distinguishing between black workers they
found to be respectable and those they did not: for example, married workers were accorded
slightly more respect.68 At Swift & Company, union member Miller did not shy away from
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describing in terms of either bemusement or scorn that the unmarried black workers lived in a
state of constant disarray, in what he referred to (without elaboration) as being a “whore-town.”69
The presentation of the miserable living conditions forced upon black workers in the
company houses was doubtlessly emphasized as one tactic in the attempt to gain the backing of
the NWLB. In every interview there were two themes touched upon at length. The first was the
difficult conditions of the workers on the job, particularly in their excessive hours and dangerous
work. The second was the living conditions of the workers, particularly the black workers who
lived at the mines. The intention of this tactic was likely to present the conditions at the mines as
one of near total neglect and abuse on the part of the mine operators. In this, the presentation of
these gruesome scenes was essential. In a very real sense, however, the union representatives
were putting the misery of the black workers on display. Not only was it a matter of typically
white workers speaking for black workers, but speaking of them in only the most degrading
contexts. Again, that this was a tactic pursued by Mine-Mill is doubtless, and that the NWLB
was interested in understanding the sanitary conditions of workers at the mines was also likely
true. However, in presenting race primarily in terms of the abuses suffered by black workers, the
white union representatives were able to draw the color line in a way that not only does not aim
at subverting the segregated norms of the region, but also tacitly reinforced them. The
sympathetic tone adopted during the portrayal of black workers' living and working conditions
often contrasts sharply with the conflicts that threatened to erupt when the white hold on skilled
work was threatened. This can be seen too in looking at how adept mine operators were at
negotiating the ambivalence of race; knowing that the color line was not fixed, but could be
manipulated as a means of undermining the unions organization.
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The poor conditions of the black workers extended far beyond the simple neglect of their
housing conditions. Off-the-job they were also taken advantage of by the mine operators by
means of predatory short term loans and high interest rates offered by the company stores or
commissaries. It was stated explicitly by the worker Hewitt that interest on loans was used by the
Phosphate Mining Company with the deliberate intent to “take advantage of the darkies.”70
Crough noted too that black workers were “practically compelled to trade at the commissary” at
the Palmetto Phosphate Company, a commissary notable not only for its high interest rates but
for the fact that the mine superintendent personally owned partial stock in the commissary and,
therefore, made profits off of the interest charged to workers.71 At the Prairie Pebble Phosphate
mines, the company issued an aluminum currency as an advance on wages, which was accepted
only at the company store and by one Mulberry vendor. Getting the aluminum scrip exchanged
for dollars was exceedingly difficult, “when negroes, want cash, as a rule, or a low grade white
man.”72 In theory, the company would buy the aluminum money back for cash, with a difference
representing a loss in real value. In practice, this was not necessarily the case.73
The presentation of the boundaries of the color line as it existed in the workplace rarely
suggested interracial sympathies. In some cases, segregated practices were explicitly upheld by
union representatives. In his interview with the NWLB, American Cyanmid Company employee
Russell recounted that at the workplace there is only a single drinking cup provided by the
company for mine workers. Crough asked if this drinking cup was shared between white and
black workers; Russell noted that it was, but that he himself would not drink from such a cup.74
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Race was also pervasive in the descriptions of the working conditions of the low-skilled
miners, particularly those who worked in the pits constantly flooded by the hydraulic hoses, in
the pervasively dusty and hot drying bins and in the task of laying dynamite to remove the
overburden. In the case of dynamite, at the Coronet mines in Pembroke it was exclusively black
workers who were chosen to do this work.75 The danger of this work was emphasized in a later
interview, which recounted a death resulting from a delayed explosion, the effect of which was
to blow the eye out of the socket of the worker.76 At the same company, and around the same
time, two more black workers were killed by dynamite.77 Similarly exhausting were the
conditions in the dry bin, which were described in every interview as being deeply intolerable
not only due to the fine dust which is constantly inhaled but also due to the excessive heat for
those workers who shoveled the dried phosphate into the carts for shipment or storage.78 The dry
bins at the Prairie Phosphate mines were staffed solely by black workers, who worked without
clothes due to the heat and with only sacks tied around their feet as protection.79 After leaving
the dry bin, sweat came off these workers like a “bucket of water.”80 Again and again, the images
of suffering black workers were presented by white union representatives; tactically, this had the
positive effect of demonstrating the conditions forced on workers by mine operators, but it also
served the purpose of differentiating the social standing of the black and white workers.
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Mine-Mill organizational strategies
The question of Mine Mill’s overall organizational strategy is one that cuts across
industrial democracy and interracial unionism. The union actively sought to circumvent direct
and immediate action in favor of pursuing mediation from the federal government first. 81 The
strategy is explained by Crough, “if you had any troubles or differences between yourself and the
company that you should put them in the hands of some government Board.”82
Ground level accounts of Mine-Mill’s specifically interracial tactics are scarce. One
example came during the NWLB hearing of the Charleston Mining and Manufacturing Company
in Fort Meade, where a white union worker gave some insight into the organization between
races, noting that white workers were organized first, but that immediately thereafter black
workers were admitted into the union and organized alongside them.83 The tense racial politics
inspired by the union’s interracial strategy recurred throughout the Charleston hearings.
Interviewee Colbert explained that black workers were offered by mine operators the positions of
the white workers who had been agitating for union organization, and guaranteed that in the
instance that the black workers simply left the union they would be given all of the principle
skilled positions, including the running of the machinery and the foreman jobs.84 Black workers
responded to this exactly as the mine operators hoped that they would not – by reporting the
offer to the heads of the union.85 Crough wasted no time in asking Colbert, “so the company is
actually trying to create race disturbances in the district?”86 The response from the interviewee
was affirmative, and he noted that there would have been trouble (that is to say, racial conflict)
81
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“if he had done it other than union men.” 87 Colbert noted too that had the replacement of white
skilled positions with black workers taken place it would have not only been a matter of
contention with the workers, but with “the entire community,” that the “citizens would have
resented it.”88 Hancock, another employee of Charleston, also stated that he did not believe “the
citizens and the community would stand for it.”89 Colbert began to discuss an instance at a
different mine in which this occurred, “there was a case similar the other night” – but he was cut
short by Crough, and never finished the thought. Even in this silence the tension that existed
within the district’s workers and community as a whole is evident. While interracial organization
was pursued, the advantages of skilled work remained the domain of white workers exclusively,
even among union members.
The attitudes of the mine management toward organization varied; in some cases, lower
level shift supervisors were members of the union. However, the attitudes toward interracial
unionism, though rarely stated, are instructive in those instances in which they are. One such
example was offered by a mining foreman, Mr. James, of Charleston Mining who, though
sympathetic in general with the demands of the workers and offering no qualms for white
organization, lamented that the union allowed black workers for the fact that “the more you pet a
Negro, the sorrier he was.”90
During the 1919 strike the interracial composition of the union was rarely made note of
by the local press. Despite this, racial tensions frequently played a role in reports of the strike, as
black workers were most typically presented as strikebreakers who worked either for the mine
operators or were used by the operators, even against their will, as a means of disrupting the
87
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strike.91 One report featured a mine operator having to deny that “Negroes are kept on job by
gunmen.”92 This report is presented more generally as a demonstration that black workers were
being used successfully as strikebreakers at the Coronet and Palmetto Phosphate Company
mines.93
The image of black strikebreakers became a consistent theme in the public press
regarding the strike. Union members were less often recognized (or vilified) for their interracial
organization; instead they were portrayed as being consistently aggressive toward black
strikebreakers. The first such report found that a white worker, implied to be a union member,
shot a recently arrived black strikebreaker without provocation.94 The same claim was made in a
different instance only months later, when “one negro who is supposed to be one of the strike
breakers recently arrived” was fatally shot by, supposedly, a white union member.95 Mine-Mill
denied these accusations, though, claiming that they represented an effort on the part of the
company gunmen and sheriffs to present the union in as poor a light as possible.
Brian Kelly’s recognition that diverse class interests are not solely the domain of white
workers, but exist in black communities as well is worth heeding.96 But he also refuses to
downplay that employers often used the divisive politics of the color line as a tool against
workers. Both insights can also be applied to the Florida phosphate mines. Intra-racial conflict
appeared to have been much less common among phosphate workers than in the black
communities formed by Alabama coal miners. This is due in part to the economic composition of
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the black phosphate workers: many of whom, being low-skill company employees who lived onsite in company housing and restricted capacity to travel, did not have much contact with a larger
black community in the area. However, deliberate action was taken by mine operators to seed
dissension among and between workers; utilizing the color line as a weapon against Mine-Mill.
The most significant example of the sort of intra-racial antagonism as documented by
Kelly was given during the NWLB hearing for the Palmetto Phosphate Company. The mine
operators offered a car for the services of a black anti-union organizer.97 The novelty of this was
that car ownership was exceptionally unusual among black workers. As Russell stated, “no
Negroes have automobiles.”98 The “colored man” was referred to only by his last name, Mayes,
and the car he was given was a $500 Ford purchased by the superintendent of the Palmetto
Phosphate Company, Mansfield.99 It was explained in the NWLB interview that Mayes drove to
mining camps and workplaces to preach about the Red Cross, whom he ostensibly represented,
and aimed to gain support among black workers for the purpose of building schools and
shows.100 One of these instances took place at a black church, and the service was attended by
Mansfield and his wife, who spoke to the attendees during the service. However, Russell and
Crough continued the interview to note that there was little popular sympathy among black
workers for Mayes or his work – “the only ill feeling among the colored people of this district at
this time is against this man.”101 It was further stated, by Crough – here speaking for the black
miners – that they considered Mayes to be a “company tool” and no longer allowed him to come
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into their housing area.102 A later interviewee noted that “all” of the black workers at Palmetto
were members of the union, and affirmed that the intentions of Mayes was to create dissension
that could lead ultimately to “race riots and trouble.”103 In a Fort Meade Leader newspaper
article excerpted in the NWLB interview, it was noted that the attendance of Mayes preaching
was “a large number of white people” and “only a few of the colored people.”104 This appears to
verify Russell and Crough’s contention that Mayes’ efforts fell on deaf ears among black
workers, all of whom were unionized.
But perhaps the most notable aspect of the interracial unionism of the Mine-Mill in
Florida is how rarely it was presented either as a central aim or even as an aspect of the
organizational strategy of the union. The union clearly sought to avoid being painted as a radical
organization, as their frequent denials of association with the IWW attested.105 It was the specific
conditions of industrial democracy that enabled Mine-Mill to achieve the limited success that
they did as an interracial organization and to do so while simultaneously avoiding the implication
that they were interested in either radical political aims or in upsetting the social fabric of Jim
Crow.
It is helpful to consider the arguments made by labor historian Alan Draper in his article,
“The New Southern Labor History Revisited,” which engages both with the interracial unionism
of Letwin and McKiven and with the interracial strategy of the Mine-Mill union of Alabama
during the 1930s. In his article, Draper argues that the success of Mine-Mill depended not upon
any organizational radicalism or class unity between black and white workers but, more
fundamentally, on the intervention of larger organizations above union. Namely, the federal
102
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government and the corporate owners of the mining operators.106 Draper’s pessimism appears
unwavering, citing political scientist E. E. Schattsneider’s assertion, “it is the loser who calls for
outside help.”107 Draper finds the 1930s Alabama Mine-Mill to be only putatively radical and
even without consideration for its ideological stance, to be fundamentally overpowered by the
constraining forces (corporate and government) operating above it. Draper’s article is one of the
few works in the secondary literature that explores the strategies of Mine-Mill and his findings
appear almost hostile to the idea of interracial sentiment. This is a healthy skepticism, but it is
perhaps overstated. The Alabama Mine-Mill did require government intervention on their behalf,
and the company did acquiesce – but if they posed so little threat, it is unlikely that the latter
would have occurred at all. Moreover, Draper comes close to contradicting his own thesis when
in the same paragraph he attributes some of Birmingham Mine-Mill’s organizational success to
the greater reception the union had among black workers; and then, sentences later, says that it
was the presence of “broader forces” and “employer strategy” that ultimately accounted for this
same success.108 If “local structures” were powerful enough to prevent organization, then the
ability of black workers to organize likely would have amounted to no difference at all and these
same local structures would have felt little need to respond to such a powerless union.109
Draper provides an important context for the activities of the Florida Mine-Mill. What
Draper presents as failings of the Mine-Mill – that they were reliant on the intervention of the
government, that their aims were not as politically radical as some have claimed – are only
inverse images of the positive picture given by McCartin’s industrial democracy. If it is
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recognized that Southern unions faced steep odds and opposition within and without the working
community, then examining their tactics in terms of unequivocal “winners” and “losers,” or
examining their interracial policies as unequivocal egalitarian or segregationist quickly becomes
an untenable position. If industrial democracy is accepted as a valid category of analysis, and if
Mine-Mill’s tactics adhere to those found by McCartin to be operative across the country during
these years, then it is easier to understand Mine-Mill more sympathetically. Florida’s Mine-Mill
did rely on the authority and mediation of the federal government and did so within a framework
that expressly denied any radical or subversive political aims; these should not, though, be
presented as failings, but analyzed as methods and tactics employed by the union to navigate a
hostile Jim Crow South.
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CHAPTER TWO
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
As one wry trade journalist put it in 1921, “contrary to popular belief, the most surprising
industry of Florida is not agriculture; not cigar manufacturing; not even taking money away from
tourists; but mining – more particularly, the mining of phosphate rock.”1 Not only was phosphate
mining the “most surprising” industry in New South Florida, it was also one of its most
industrialized and productive, annually accounting for more than 75% of the domestic
production of phosphate and the majority of world production between 1900 and 1930.2 This
suggests the importance of the industry for an understanding of mining technology. The
historiography on mining during this period is rich with studies of Alabama coal mining, with the
mining of the Appalachians and the expansion of Western mining. Yet nothing has been written
on the technology of Florida’s largest mining industry, one that, due to its almost exclusive
reliance on surface or open-pit mining, offers potentially new understandings of the
implementation of mining technology and its change.
But when examined, what is most striking about the industry during this period is how
rare and relatively small the technological changes that took place were. The picture that
emerges from the primary sources is one in which technology plays a subordinate role to other
determinate factors. Florida’s phosphate mining industry demonstrates that technology exists
only as part of a complex structure, which includes labor, productive capacity (including
available capital and resources), intra-industry competition and wider market conditions. More
specifically, I argue in this chapter that technological change takes place in the Florida phosphate
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industry only within a framework of industry-wide competition or antagonism. This competition
derives from intra-industry (or intra-capital) competition, capitalist world market conditions,
antagonism between labor and capital and competition amongst laborers. Technological change
here is largely determined (enabled or limited) by the conditions existing within each of those
factors. As such, understanding the interplay between these factors is crucial to understanding
the changes in phosphate mining technology.
In looking at the history of technology from a largely economic perspective, this chapter
adopts but modifies the perspective of Joel Mokyr in The Lever of Riches.3 The most crucial
aspect is his definition of technological change, adopted herein: “increases in the productive
potential of the economy.”4 Mokyr places technological change at odds with the disruptive
effects of capitalist industry: unemployment, mismanagement – both of which are merely poor
uses of resources.5 But Mokyr’s stance on productive potential is perhaps overly sanguine when
applied to this specific industry. As a corollary to the primary argument of this paper, I assert
that technological change may not be prevented by simple misuse or poor use of resources, but
can be deliberately managed away in an industry for which technological change would be
economically destabilizing (a loss of profits), even when greater efficiency would be “better” for
consumers.
Mokyr connects the history of technological change with that of economic growth by
focusing on what he terms “Schumpeterian growth.”6 This is a “free lunch” provided for
economic productivity by increases in technological knowledge. But this appears to
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misunderstand the thrust of Joseph Schumpeter’s economic theory. The point of Schumpeter’s
rejection of equilibrium in favor of change was not an embrace of the “free lunch” provided by
technological change, but to emphasize the destabilizing effect of capitalist development; the
“creative destruction” of technological change decisively does not offer free lunches, but
instability and disequilibrium.7 That this disequilibrium is the basis of an upsurge of productivity
is not meant to minimize the “destruction” half of “creative destruction,” as any elimination of
capital can provide such a basis for renewed growth, whether it is the “destruction” of old
technology by the implementation of new technology or the destruction of productive capacity
by, say, a World War. Mokyr rejects Schumpeter’s attribution of widespread technological
change to capitalism specifically, but in doing so misunderstands Schumpeter. The argument was
not that technological before capitalism was insignificant but that technological change takes
place in a fundamentally different manner when it occurs within a capitalist economic
framework. And this “fundamentally different manner” is strikingly illustrated by Florida’s
phosphate industry.
My reading of Mokyr, then, is supplemented by insights from historian Giovanni Arrighi
(deeply influenced by Schumpeter), who treats the relationship between economic and
technological change less optimistically. Arrighi provides a framework for understanding the
competition that occurs between capitalists within an industry and on the world market as
derived from a drive toward a destabilizing accumulation of capital and which tends to result in
overproduction or overaccumulation, crises that the industry must attempt to suppress.8 The
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definition of “capital” employed in this chapter is derived from Marx and shared by Arrighi.
Capital is the economic form that commodities take when they exist as self-expanding value, or
in the process of accumulating more capital. Two particularly important classes of commodities
for the accumulation of capital are constant capital, such as machinery, factories, technology and
variable capital, or labor. The value expands as a result of a process by which commodities
become money to become commodities again (or C-M-C) and then when the money-capital
generated in this processes is invested in commodities to be returned at a greater value (M-CM’). It is the entire process that matters, not simply one moment in the process (so capital is not
simply “net worth.”) Capital is a “repetitive, expansive” process that aims primarily at the
accumulation of more capital.9 The duty of capitalists, then, is to see that capital can “selfexpand,” or that more capital can be made out of the capital that already exists.10
The purpose of this chapters is not to propose a counterfactual (that phosphate should
have been more productive relative to similar industries; although this can be seen), but to
dispute certain categories used within the history of technology as a method for analyzing
modern capitalist industries.11 The temptation of historians of technology to paint a picture of
technological change as a “free lunch” or as stable advances in productive capacity, independent
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of the economic framework (and the concepts used to identify that framework), is to be avoided.
The industry was noted for its stagnant technology – plants remained unchanged for decades.
And when technological change took place, it did so to eliminate labor. Therefore, looking at the
industry from the prospective of “free lunches” will yield little historical insight. A different
concept seems necessary – one in which technological change is subordinate to the intrinsically
conflictual dynamics of capitalist competition.
The chapter is structured analytically rather than narratively, examining first the practices
and technologies of mining basically independent of their framework (in an “internalist” fashion,
done for the sake of clarity), then examining the larger economic conditions of the industry in
terms of productive capacity, centralization, market conditions and capital-labor relationships in
order to present the underlying structural dynamics that acted on the practices described. This
section further attempts to explain the relations between the technological and economic aspects
in terms derived from Arrighi and heterodox economics.

Mining technology and practice
As suggested by Mokyr’s definition of technological change, the importance of
technology for an industry such as phosphate mining is essentially how much that technology is
able to increase productive capacity. The different technologies employed by the industry will be
detailed and examined in light of their potential effects on efficiency and productivity. Although
this section narrates changes internal to the technical process of mining, it does so with an
intention ultimately to invert or ironize this internality. Far from being an autonomous process,
each change will be shown to rely on processes of capital accumulation and its crises. Detailing
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these processes at length is also warranted by the fact that this has not been done at all in the
meager secondary literature on the phosphate industry.12
“Phosphate mining” is shorthand for a process that involved a number of different
practices and technologies. The mining of phosphate during this period occurred in four distinct
steps; although there was some overlap between the steps in technology and methods, it is useful
to keep them conceptually separated. Although these practices were separate, they occurred in
close proximity to each other, and were jointly considered to have constituted “phosphate
mining” within the industry, and laborers who worked in one area of the operation could and did
often switch to others.
Stated briefly, the four practices that comprised mining were: the removal of overburden
(the soil above the phosphate), the mining of the matrix (the layer containing phosphate), the
washing of the matrix to extract the phosphate rock and the drying of that phosphate rock for
storage or shipment. Each of these techniques could develop separately, with changes in one
technique rarely necessitating the change of another. Moreover, the utilization of these practices
differed depending on the type of phosphate mined. There are three in Florida: hard rock
phosphates, land pebble phosphates and river pebble phosphates.13 Although river pebble was
discovered first, and hard rock remained viable for many years, it was land pebble phosphate that
was the central resource utilized by the industry in Florida. These land pebble rocks were found
primarily in Central Florida, in Polk, Hillsborough and DeSoto counties.14 Land pebble
phosphate itself consisted of whitish pebbles that can range in size from small grains to pieces as
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large as an inch, and are embedded in a matrix of sand and clay.15 The predominance of land
pebble mining will be reflected in the discussion of technology, which will discuss hard rock and
river pebble phosphate mining methods only insofar as the contrast or comparison will prove
illuminating for the practice of land pebble phosphate mining.
“Overburden” referred to the layer of earth that lays on top of the phosphate that is
buried beneath the surface. It was typically made of sand and clay, and often was found as three
sedimented layers of fine sands and soils at the surface, a thicker layer of hard black clay and
deposits of sand and clay.16 The depth of the overburden capable of being mined in this period
initially ranged from four to twenty five feet.17 By 1920, overburden of 35 feet was found and
capable of being removed.18
Before 1900, particularly in the hard rock fields, the method of removing overburden was
performed by hand, using picks, shovels and wheelbarrows.19 In 1903, a trade journal described
the method of overburden removal as scraping performed by the labor of “negroes and mules.”20
It was nowhere explicitly mentioned, but likely, that the reliance of the industry in its early years
on convict laborers, who offered a stable source of labor required by law to perform tasks that
free labor likely would have refused to, enabled this method of overburden removal.21 This
method persisted for longer in the mining of hard rock than it did in land pebble, and by 1906 a
combination of hydraulics and steam shovels had become the industry standard for land pebble
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overburden removal.22 In the hard rock industry, even when steam shovels were available, the
wide use of picks and shovels persisted until as late as 1915, and possibly later.23
Given that the hydraulic method used for overburden removal was basically identical to
that used to mine the rock matrix, this section will focus on steam shovel usage, which predated
and continued alongside hydraulic methods as late as 1919. This were the first mechanical
technology introduced to assist in overburden removal. Steam shovels would lift the overburden
out of the ground and place it into cars on temporary or permanently laid tracks of rail, which
would take it to waste dumps.24 Accompanying steam shovels would be trams, tracks and
engines.25 In the first decade of mining, the character of the overburden deposit dictated the
choice between steam shovels or hydraulic methods.26 Looser clays or sands were removed
easily by hydraulic methods, while harder clays or “conglomerates” which were unbreakable for
the hydraulic hoses were dealt with by steam shovels.27 Describing a steam shovel used in
overburden removal in a 1912 trade journal, John Allan Barr found that they were laid upon
movable tracks, with a boom of 35 feet, which carried a shovel or dipper of one to two-and-ahalf yards.28
By the middle of the 1910s, when steam shovels were becoming less common for
overburden removal, the method of dealing with thick or difficult deposits of overburden was
dynamite of typically 60 percent nitroglycerin, buried at up to 20 sticks per time into the
overburden, which after detonated, loosened the materials enough that they could be removed by
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water.29 The wide use of dynamite in the industry during the late 1910s was one of the principal
areas of contention among workers. Recall the dynamite-related fatalities or injuries documented
during the NWLB interviews, including the worker whose eye was blown out of its socket after
failing to evacuate quickly enough.30
By 1913, hydraulic methods had become the preferred methods used for removing the
overburden of pebble phosphate.31 By 1919 steam shovels were rarely used for anything but
assisting in the hydraulic method (such as digging dams or temporary canals for the water).32 But
by the 1930s, the hydraulic method was being wholly replaced by “dry-mining,” or the use of
large electric draglines, which both removed the overburden and mined the rock.33 Although
electric draglines had been present on phosphate plants since at least 1919, the change in
methods took hold in the 1920s, and had become the predominant, though by no means
exclusive, method of overburden removal by 1924.34 The draglines that were used in 1925
weighed 320 tons with a boom of 150 feet and a bucket of 6 yards – a considerable increase
compared to the 35 foot steam shovels booms of only 15 years prior.35 These draglines were
powered electrically or by oil-fired steam.36 By 1929 the booms were commonly as high as 165
feet and the buckets of 8 cubic yards. The material that was cut by the draglines was commonly
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emptied into a previously mined pit.37 The question, then, is this: what accounts for the change?
If electric draglines had been present, and successfully used in other open-pit industries such as
gravel mining by 1922, why did their implementation take place when it did?38 The
contemporary sources simply note the change, and hazard no explanation for its cause. It seems
exceedingly likely that the adoption of draglines was not due to a greater overall productivity, as
hydraulic overburden removal was remarkably efficient: rather, their adoption was due to their
being a labor saving device. Which is to say, the adoption of draglines over hydraulics in
overburden removal was likely due to increasing antagonism in the early and mid-1920s between
capital and labor, the former diligently cutting any positions which it could of the latter to avoid
rising labor costs or the possibilities of renewed striking, as the industry had seen in 1919.
After the overburden was removed, the next step was to mine the rock matrix. The
phosphate matrix is a soft and basically homogeneous mixture of sand and gravel.39 Before 1900
and for the first few years of the decade, the mining of land pebble phosphates was exceedingly
rudimentary: pick and shovel. The hydraulic method was introduced by W. F. Lay and its
superiority to other methods was already noted in 1900, “undoubtedly the only practical method
of mining this rock.”40 As such, the mining of the pebble rock matrix was intractably tied to the
development of hydraulic methods of open pit mining – for the period examined, phosphate
mining was nearly synonymous with hydraulic mining. By 1906, the fact that hydraulic mining
was considerably more “economical of labor” than the use of steam shovels or hand mining was
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recognized and reflected by its industry-wide adoption and dominance for the following three
decades.41
Illustrative of the typical technology of the industry, the hydraulic gun used by the Pierce
Phosphate Plant in 1909 used a 2 ½ inch stream fired from their hydraulic giant (the industry
term for the hose) directly onto the matrix, under pressures of 100 to 125 pounds per square
inch.42 This was a small increased in pressure capacity over what was available in 1900, the
giants of which could not exceed 110 pounds.43 At this plant, after the matrix was washed into
the sump hole, the two 10 inch centrifugal gravel pumps took the matrix a distance of 80 feet to
the washing station.44 The pumps were arranged such that the first, which was nearer the sump
hole and stationed at a bend in the hydraulic pipe, fed directly into the second, which was located
near the washing station.45 These 10 inch centrifugal pumps were the standard technology used
by the industry in 1910, and equivalents of increasingly efficient pumping capabilities would
continue to be used through the 1910s and 1920s.46
The giants required skillful manipulation and aim in order to operate successfully.
Mendenhall, a trade journalist on mining, ultimately threw his hands up at the task of a complete
description of the practice, deeming it “impossible to describe.”47 This is because the streams of
water did not merely remove the matrix but guided it by improvising the placement of small
temporary ditches dug out by the pressure of the hydraulic giant.48 These ditches collected and
directed the matrix toward the canals and ultimately toward the sump hole. If any of the typical
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pit labor could be described as skilled labor, it was operating a hydraulic giant. By 1912 the
reported pressure capacity of the hydraulic giants had increased to 150 pounds-per-square inch,
although little else in the technology had changed.49 In the intervening decade, the pressure used
in matrix mining from the giants remained basically consistent, and 125 pounds per square inch
was still a reasonable amount for 1920.50
Given the reliance of hydraulic mining on water, providing and maintaining consistent
sources of water was an obvious concern for the industry. The source of the water for the
Coronet plant in Pebroke, and presumably for plants near enough to make it feasible, was the
Peace River.51 Otherwise, wells were dug, as water was typically found as near as 18 to 24 feet
to the surface.52 The problem was rarely finding water; it is more typically keeping water out of
the pits, as attested to repeatedly by laborers in the National War Labor Board interviews. One
such laborer described how every Monday the pits would have to be pumped out to a state in
which they could be worked again.53 The description in a 1920 trade journal was consistent with
this, the pumps being similar electric centrifugal pumps as those used to transport the matrix.54
The means of creating the pressure from the water source necessary for the hydraulic giants was
by decreasing the size of the pipe leading to the nozzle from the pumping station: at the latter, it
begins at fourteen inches in diameter.55 The galvanized pipe used for the giants were
supplemented with ball-and-socket joints to facilitate their movement.56 When the mining took
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place too far from the location of the sump, the giants were used to blast new ones into the
ground, typically 50 to 75 feet from the area being worked.57
After mining the rock it was pumped to the top of the washing station, where the next
stage in the process began. Briefly, it consisted in working the matrix so as to separate the pebble
from the sand and clay, which contained no phosphate. Although for the three decades examined
no major changes in the practice occurred, washing the rock was the process for which the most
incremental and seemingly minor changes could amount to the largest differences. The addition
of one or two extra sifting screens could drastically increase the amount of phosphate separated.
Likewise, inattention to the potentially salvageable parts of the matrix could lead to large losses.
The importance of good washing technique was stressed in nearly every Annual Report
issued by the Florida State Geological Survey. In 1907, state geologist E. H. Sellards lamented
the tremendous waste of salvageable phosphate materials from the matrix due to the mining
operating “as economically as present conditions allow” – which is to say, they had to operate
somewhat sloppily, and lose fine phosphate materials, simply in order to meet the intra-industry
competitive levels.58 In 1908 Sellards asserted that fully one-half of the phosphatic material in
the matrix is lost during the washing process and goes into the waste dumps.59
Writing in 1905, the process described by trade journalist H. E. Memminger was echoed
in nearly every subsequent description of washing. The practice was simple: the wet matrix was
discharged onto a separator, which is a rotary screen with 1 ½ inch perforations.60 After this was
separated out the larger chunks of clay, the materials fell onto an inclined mesh screen which
57
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leads to a set of log washers. This washed the rock, and it fell then into a series of increasingly
fine screens, pushed on by clean water. This basic set up of separator, log washer and screens
would remain the standard for the period, although there was tremendous variation in the specific
layout that each plant would employ.61 A typical separator in 1908 was 18 feet long by 6 feet
wide; the “logs” were 8 in by 18 feet cast iron pipes with blades bolted to their exterior, which
were rotated by a series of gears.62 These logs were set into an inclined wooden box full of water,
and the movement of the blades was sufficient to remove the unwanted materials from the
phosphate. The variation, to give one example (the Medulla Phosphate Co. plant in 1908) came
in that, after passing through the separator, log washer and screens, the materials passed again
into another log washer, followed by another set of screens.63
Sellards, as incensed as was typical for him at the loss of materials during the washing
process, was pleased to find that it had improved substantially by the introduction of more steps
and finer screens by 1912.64 One addition Sellards also reported was the implementation of a
crusher in the log washer: this was used in plants that excluded the initial separator stage in favor
of a less discriminating screen; the crusher reduced the size of the materials while the phosphate
was being washed and in doing so, the salvageable materials that may have been in the larger
pieces that the separator would have excluded are saved.65
In 1925, the design of the basic washing facility was still essentially the same.66
However, the Florida Geological Survey’s report for this year pointed out something that would
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become central for the industry: the interest of companies in methods outside of the traditional
washing process to recover phosphate.67 One such method was volatilizing the phosphate by heat
or electricity. Every year in the late 1920s brought notice to the importance of the fine materials
that had previously been filtered out by screens but were becoming recognized as possessing an
amount of phosphate worth recovering. The most significant advance in the washing process
occurred just outside of the scope of this chapter: the introduction of hydraulic classification and
chemical flotation. Of the two, flotation would be the more significant, and remained an essential
element of the industry for decades thereafter. Given that it falls just outside of both the period
examined (1930 was when it began to be adopted) and outside of the mining pits itself, it will not
be described at length. But simply, chemical flotation consisted in placing the matrix in a fluid
with chemical reagents which stripped the phosphatic materials from the waste and achieved
recovery rates far beyond anything that simple washing was capable of doing.
After being washed, the next and final stage in the process of rock mining was drying.
The predominant method for drying the washed phosphate was introduced in the 1890s – the use
of rotary driers.68 These rotary driers were made of iron and were placed with one end at a brick
furnace and the other end open to allow the feeding of the rock. The phosphate was then driven
toward the flames of the furnace, which heated the length of the cylinder, but dropped out onto a
screen before reaching the fire.69 Although this method remained consistent, the size and
capacity of the iron rotary driers increased over time. A standard length in the first years of the
1900s was 12 to 25 feet, with a 30 in diameter, and was fueled by a wood fire.70 By 1910 the
rotary driers had increased to 30 feet and the furnace fueled by oil, and the following decade saw
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the diameters increase to 50 inches.71 Writing in 1907, and providing a more detailed description,
engineer Granberby Jackson noted that the rotary driers were rotated atop trunnion wheels at 15
rpm.72 More significantly, Jackson notes the adoption of mechanical methods for feeding the
furnace, which had been an exceedingly dangerous job previously.73
The most notable change in the drying process was the movement of the rock after it had
already been dried. This was, along with wet conditions and dynamite, the most frequently cited
concern of the miners.74 After the rock had been dried it was lifted by a conveyor belt above the
dry bins where it could be stored or transported; the practice of getting the rock into the bins was,
until mechanization occurred after the early 1920s, the work of laborers with shovels.75 The men,
clothed with sacks around their feet to prevent the rock from burning through their shoes too
quickly, which it often would, were subjected to a persistent level of dust which was, by all
accounts, unbearable after more than only a few hours.76 It is likely that the mechanization of this
process was undertaken due to it being one of the principal points of contention in the conflict
between labor and capital, over the harshness of the labor. Rather than making the work more
bearable, the unskilled jobs were simply eliminated from the payroll, and the workers who held
those jobs along with it. A drying facility in 1924 was already largely empty of human
presence.77
The changes in mining technology during the period of 1900 to 1930 were minimal. The
industry existed in something of a stasis for nearly 30 years, reaching a capacity of production in
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1909 that remained consistent for the remainder of the period. Aside from an early transition
from steam shovels to hydraulic methods in the removal of overburden, a plant in 1905 and a
plant in 1920, or even 1925, looked in most respects identical. If technological change is, as
Mokyr defined it, productive potential, then it is the absence of such change that stands out most
for Florida’s phosphate industry in this period.78 What, then, are the economic conditions that
accompanied the adoption or pursuit of greater productive potential?

Economic conditions, competition and antagonism
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect for understanding the economic side of the
industry’s technological change is that of productive capacity – Mokyr’s productive potential.
But considering productive potential as a single category threatens to undermine the specificity
of both the industry’s productivity and the nature of capitalist mining production. As Department
of Labor economists Haskell and Kiessling lucidly explained, productive potential must be
understood in two senses, which are related but often opposed: first, the large-scale productive
capacity of a plant or of the industry as a whole and second, the small scale efficiency of
production offered by each laborer given that laborer’s technology and methods.79 Haskell and
Kiessling called the latter “output-per-man” and it corresponds to any and all “labor saving
technology.”80 Most of the technological changes detailed above are of the latter character, while
the economic concentration and conglomeration detailed below are of the former. The effect of
increasing output-per-man productivity without a corresponding increase in large scale
productive potential is quite simply unemployment. Considered from the perspective of labor,
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labor saving technology can theoretically be beneficial, but is far more often an effort by capital
to reduce on the whole the labor necessary, and results not in better work but in no work at all.
This is the endgame of the battle over “labor process” that is detailed most explicitly in the
historiography of mining technology in historian of technology Keith Dix’s What’s a Coal Miner
to Do? Dix’s titular question was raised in response to corporate efforts to replace hand loading
by mechanized loaders – just as dry phosphate loading was replaced by mechanical means.81
The contradiction at the heart of productive potential is this: if mining labor becomes
more efficient without a corresponding increase in productive capacity, it leads to
unemployment; but if productive capacity increases without corresponding labor efficiency, it
becomes unfeasible to operate at that expanded level profitably.82
The importance of large scale productive capacity was widely noted in annual
governmental reports and trade journals.83 What is most interesting about the large scale
productive capacity is how quickly companies allowed it to level out at a consistent standard. A
plant built in 1913 by the Lakeland Phosphate Co. possessed the capability of mining 100,000
tons of phosphate annually.84 By 1923 this was still the most common size of plant to be built,
with construction requiring a $500,000 capital investment.85 Barriers to large scale productive
capacity would include increasing costs of production due either to labor costs or the costs of
labor-saving technological capital or an increasing difficulty of mining (such as if all of the
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surface-level matrix had been mined and overburden became deeper).86 While the latter was an
ostensible concern for the industry, it did not prove to be a real barrier to productive capacity. In
fact, any barrier that existed in terms of annual production was the result not of material
limitations, but primarily were imposed externally by market conditions or were self-imposed by
operating below full capacity. As a result of these distortions, measuring the raw productive
potential of the industry is difficult. There are reliable annual numbers for the amount of
phosphate that was actually produced, but the industry operated so far below capacity for most of
its existence that these illustrate very little in this regard. The production numbers in 1913, for
example, were practically equivalent to those of any good subsequent year and far better than
most years.87 During the war, certainly, the industry operated far below capacity; it also did in
1910 due to overproduction in the previous year and in 1919 due to the nearly year- long strike
of the workers.88 The causes of the decline in prices after the rapidly expanded production
(operating at or near capacity) in 1909 was well recognized by contemporary observers; F. B.
van Horn wrote that “this falling off of was probably due in part to overproduction.”89 The
importance of this concept, “overproduction,” cannot be too highly stressed. In 1911 C. G.
Memminger noted that increasing efficiency was largely a moot question given the already
attained levels of production the plants were capable of, yet unable to achieve due to market
conditions.90
It was recognized very early that the greatest threat to profits and to the sustainability of
the industry as a whole came not from outside, but from inside. This blight, reported on in
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publication after publication, was the tendency toward competition. The economic dynamics
underlying the industry cannot be better stated that was done by C. G. Memminger in 1904:
“some one’s neck must be broken.”91 He attributed the instability of the industry to the
widespread lack of “cooperation” among the larger corporations, and with each trying to
outcompete the other for a larger market share, the result was that prices dropped to levels so low
it become difficult, if not impossible, to maintain profitability.92 The motif quickly became
familiar. In 1911, the low prices still plaguing the industry were due to “unnecessary and
unfortunate competition” and just as surely as issues of Engineering and Mining Journal or The
American Fertilizer brought reports of over-competition, low prices and consolidations, they also
brought the reassurance that in terms of mining methods, there were essentially “no changes.”93
The methods that the industry used to address this excessive competition were
monopolization, conglomeration and consolidation – either buying out the competition or driving
them to bankruptcy until cooperation could be achieved between the remaining large firms, who
share an interest in maintaining a “uniform price.”94 This was called for as early as 1902, the idea
being that the “speculative element,” which resulted from a large number of competing
companies would be stifled – which, in industry terms, if not the consumer’s, is good.95 And this
is precisely what happened. By the middle of the first decade, the industry was known for its
“Big Five” – the largest scale producers who began to assert a de facto monopoly on the
industry.96 The intense, rapid pace of this wave of bankruptcy and buyouts can be demonstrated
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just by looking at the numbers of phosphate mining companies operating in Central Florida: in
1891, 215; in 1894, 53 and by the first decade of the 1900s, only a dozen or so were
economically feasible in the pebble district.97 But even during this period, the allure of
underselling for quick profits brought on competition between the largest operators.98 In 1910 the
competition that existed, and which resulted in “unprecedented depression” for the industry, was
still attributed to overproduction and competitive price cutting, openly described as “struggle.”99
As such, the competition of the first half of the period would eventually be replaced by
cartelization in the second half, when threats from outside the local industry became more
prevalent and large producers took advantage of war-time conditions (specifically, the WebbPomerene Act) to meet those threats.
Thus, in the terms used and defined by Giovanni Arrighi, the industry as a whole faced
two fundamental threats with regard to its profitability and stability: overproduction and
overaccumulation.100 The former describes a condition of excessive competition, which has the
effect of producing an excess in goods, with a corresponding decrease in value (prices, thus
profits). The year of 1909 is one such example, and this was the principle form that crises in the
industry took in the period before 1920. Overaccumulation is shorthand for the
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“overaccumulation of capital,” which means productive capacities or available capital that far
outstrip the actual production that corporations can undertake at a profitable level.
Overaccumulation is the form that intra-industry crises often took in the period after 1920, 1924
being a particularly illuminating example.101 In 1924, the plants were operating at 50% beneath
their full capacity, which simultaneously depressed the market but prevented a situation of
overproduction.102 Overaccumulation can be observed in the production numbers in all of the
years following the explosively productive year of 1919, the heights of which were never
matched during the 1920s, despite the industry’s capacity to do so. Both overproduction and
overaccumulation are inextricably linked to the level of technological development of the
industry.
The early establishment of a uniform price was largely the market at work; companies
with greater capital resources absorbed or bankrupted the smaller companies and the speculative
element at work in the industry was gradually quelled. Writing in 1909, trade journalist C. A.
Stone could say confidently that the Florida phosphate industry as a whole was “controlled” by
only twelve companies, four in the hard rock district and eight in the pebble.103 But even despite
this, the destabilizing effects continued to be felt. As state geologist Herman Gunter noted at the
close of the period, 1928, the industry brought in significantly less “value” per annual tons
produced than it did in 1900 – competition and even the relatively minimal changes in mining
technology had the effect of driving down the collective profits available for the mining
corporations.104
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There were two external, world market events that shaped the functioning of the industry.
The first was an increasing prevalence of North African phosphates (from Morocco and Tunisia)
on the world stage; the second was the First World War.105 The disruption that the First World
War brought upon the industry was remarkable and immediately visible. Production numbers
plummeted deeply after 1913 and remained low until the tremendous upsurge in 1919, after
world markets reopened.106 The effect of this was that the industry had to deeply curtail
production during the war, with plants operating below capacity for fear of upsetting the market
prices. The fact that the industry was capable of doing this – of restraining competition for the
benefit of the industry – was a remarkable feat, given the out-of-hand competition which defined
the industry in the previous decades. The second half of the period (1915-1930) in general is one
of relative stabilization after the overproduction crises of the later years of the first decade of the
1900s and the closing of external markets during the war. The introduction of fundamentally new
or of more efficient technologies in this climate would have likely resulted in greater losses than
gains for the industry as a whole.
Stabilization in the face of international competition was a strategy deliberately pursued
by the industry. In The Fertilizer Industry, economist Jesse Markham argues that the stabilization
of prices in the 1920s was due not to better market conditions after the First World War, but to a
successful effort on the part of the largest corporations to circumvent those market conditions by
means of collusion.107 For the most part, this collusion was only barely guised (taking place
under the Phosphate Export Association), and was investigated extensively by the Federal Trade
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Commission.108 The effect of the First World War was to cut off trade to Europe, and Germany
in particular, which was the largest foreign consumer of U. S. produced phosphates. After the
war ended, more lucrative phosphate fields were discovered in North Africa, which began to be
mined competitively with the Florida industry and had more immediate access to the European
market. These circumstances created pressure on the existing companies to “cooperate” more
closely than ever before. The member companies of the Phosphate Export Association met
regularly to decide export prices, with equivalent input from each of their companies, and each
company was allowed access to the books and records of the others.109 Before long the export
agreements appear to have become implicit domestic price agreement, and the market
superficially stabilized during the 1920s. This was a superficial stabilization in the sense that the
companies deliberately inflated demand in the domestic market by refraining from investing their
capital to lower marginal cost and prices. Any investment of the capital would threaten to reduce
prices by increasing large-scale productivity and output-per-man, which would upset the agreed
upon balance, and depress profits for every company. In short, and in a manner which is exactly
illustrative of Arrighi’s theory of economic crisis, capital accumulated superfluously because
investment in technological change would have decreased profits.
Before the industry had stabilized in the 1920s by operating at reduced capacity they
faced one other challenge: this time from labor. That labor time and labor costs were a
tremendous concern for an industry that reliably had troubles breaking even, much less turning a
profit, is shown by mine operators’ collective response to the labor activity that took hold in the
region beginning in 1918 and lasted until the early months of 1920. Given their situation of
excess capital and meager profit, the complication that could most threaten mine operators’
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already precarious industry was a protracted labor dispute. This is precisely what occurred. In the
months between April and early December, thousands of workers in the land pebble industry
struck for shorter hours (8, rather than 12) and higher wages.110 Production was brought to a
complete halt. In 1918, a year prior to the strike, the response of corporations to the workers’
demands was that they would sooner close down the plants and cease production.111 This
happened, although not on the industry’s terms.
The most crucial demand made by the workers, as attested to in their National War Labor
Board hearings, was shorter hours. Plants ran two 12 hour shifts per day, day and night, while
other mining industries across the country had standardized 8 hour shifts. The conditions
described in National War Labor Interviews were severe. The work of historian Moishe Postone
on labor time proves illuminating. For Postone the antagonism between labor and capital was
one principally based on the determination of the worker’s labor time. The position of capital in
this situation is somewhat paradoxical: on one hand, longer hours means more production (more
“value” being created), but on the other, capital is typically driven to shorten hours by increasing
efficiency. But in the phosphate industry’s case, more efficiency was precisely not what was
wanted. But the worker’s demand for shorter hours ended up being, essentially, one for greater
technological efficiency. Shorter hours were unfeasible unless output-per-man was made
correspondingly greater. In increasing output-per-man, the amount of man power (and labor
time) needed in total is decreased.112 Which ultimately means, for workers, technological
unemployment.113
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The irony of the industry’s reluctant technological change is perfectly illustrated in the
decade following the strike: the mines were made more efficient, and the savage conditions of
the pits and driers were largely ameliorated by more efficient technological methods – but it did
so by getting rid of those miners’ positions, permanently. Miners complained about their
conditions and so the industry changed the conditions by firing the miners and eliminating the
positions from the payroll. This tendency of the industry is excellently illustrated in Haskell and
Kiesseling’s employment statistics, which was a steady downward slope.114 This appears to be
the most compelling explanation behind the switch the “dry-mining,” or the transition to electric
draglines that occurred in the mid-1920s and would become industry-standard thereafter.
But beyond the mine pit itself, the focus the industry took on increasing the quality of the
phosphate rock by means of superior washing and sorting methods was hardly coincidental.
Geologist William Waggaman noted in 1920 that the “high price of labor is unquestionably
stimulating the production of higher grades” of phosphate for fertilizer use.115 In the same issue,
he noted the “labor troubles,” which handicapped the Florida industry, led to lower production
levels than the industry had seen in 15 years.116 The practical effect of new sorting, classification
and flotation methods was that a similar amount of phosphate could be sold, but by doing less
mining. There is nothing inherent in market terms that would demand this transition in methods:
in 1907, it was in the name of efficiency that the fine rocks were discarded. Rather, the change
seems to come from the fact that more mining meant more time and more labor. In a climate in
which labor was increasingly demanding fewer hours, and higher pay, the introduction of
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classification and flotation, which the industry had known about for more than a decade but had
all but ignored, became a viable and attractive option.117
The seeming stasis of the industry’s technology was not one due to simple neglect of
technology or a lack of ingenuity or any other similarly reductive explanation. The absence of
“free lunches” was due not to a betrayal of the principles of Schumpeterian growth but to a strict
adherence to them. As Arrighi has theorized, by building on the works of Schumpeter, and as the
phosphate industry illustrates, conditions of disequilibrium constantly lurk near the surface of a
large-scale industry. This disequilibrium, which takes the form of competition and antagonism
between economic actors, fundamentally affects the degree to which productive potential or
technological change can take place. Market imposed and self-imposed restrictions on productive
capacity definitively discouraged the industry from operating as efficiently as possible, which
meant that the industry took interest in technological change only if it was neither disruptive or,
as in the case of the labor strikes, when it became absolutely necessary to retain profitability.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MODERN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN NEW SOUTH FLORIDA
The phosphate industry stands as one of, if not the, most characteristically “modern” of
Florida’s primary economic bases in the first decades of the 1900s.1 It was highly consolidated,
capitalized and, relative to similar industries in Florida (lumber, naval stores), it was
technologically sophisticated. But appraising an industry that upheld segregated and barely
livable housing, dismal wages and predatory pricing methods as modern displays the
ambivalence of that epithet. This ambivalence is seen in the literature on many industries in the
New South: ore mining, textile factories, lumber and naval stores.2 One of the foremost debates
at the heart of New South historiography since Woodward has been the extent to which the New
South as a whole can be considered “New.” Its dubious modernity consists primarily in the
degree to which it can be found to exhibit the qualities associated with the typical mature
capitalism of the northeast: free labor, urbanization and, above all, industrialization. The question
then is: how does Florida’s phosphate industry fit in to the picture of the New South? As modern,
fully capitalistic, or in some sense pre-capitalist, and, when this is answered, does the industry’s
inclusion into the historiography alter that debate at all?
I argue that Florida’s phosphate industry offers a particularly stark picture of unbalanced
growth, for which “new” industrialization is not contrasted with, but is concomitant upon and
exacerbates, the “old.” Unbalanced growth, is an economic concept developed both by
institutional economists and Marxist economists (“uneven development”) in an attempt to
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understand the coexistence of modernization and residual or persistent “backwardness.” The
immediate source of the concept for this chapter are New South economic historians David
Carlton and Peter Coclanis.3 The phosphate industry stood as a pocket of industrialization in an
otherwise largely rural state. It produced no lasting urbanization, as much of the industry utilized
company towns which fed growth back into company profits. Although the effects on the region
were not discernably “modern” the industry itself very thoroughly was. The industry possessed
all of the traits characteristic of a corporation on the cusp of mature, monopoly capitalism. This
includes the concentration of capital, the organizational structures of the industry, the expansion
of production and distribution.
This chapter draws on three historiographies that have not yet been connected at any
length. Those are political-economic historians of the New South; the economic history of
Florida and the institutional economic historians including and following the works of Alfred
Chandler. Although these three historiographies naturally align, that they have not yet been put
into conversation justifies the exposition and contrast of their positions. For example, almost no
work has been done to examine Florida’s economic history and its place within the “New South”
– whether that label is even applicable or if, as economic historian William Stronge argues,
Florida is better understood as a “Western economy.”4
To understand the economic significance and role of the phosphate industry, the scope
must be broadened beyond that industry alone. This is because the phosphate mining industry
existed principally as one leg of a much larger, national industry – the fertilizer industry.
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Phosphate mining provided the crucial nutrient ingredient for the creation of mixed fertilizers.5
Because of this, the fertilizer industry found it beneficial to vertically integrate phosphate mining
and phosphate rock treatment. The fertilizer industry itself was embedded within two larger,
global industries – the chemical and mineral industries.6
The secondary literature dealing specifically with the fertilizer industry is as meager as
that on the phosphate industry. The most notable monograph was published in 1958 by
economist Jesse Markham. Although he narrates changes as they occur within the industry, he
does so only barely from perspective of a historian.7 Although Markham’s economic arguments
are astute, his limitations in historical perspective abstracts the fertilizer industry from its place
within Florida’s economic history and from New South industrialization as a whole. To
supplement this, extensive framing is used to wring history from economic analysis.
Understanding the typicality or atypicality of the industry in the New South requires
understanding how it is organized. This is where institutional economics and economic history,
the framework developed by Chandler, Naomi Lamoreux amd Glenn Porter, enters. But
abstraction remains unavoidable.8 Only once a cut-away portrait of the industry in terms of its
capital, financing, investments and organizational structure is drawn can it be seen how integral
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to the New South it was, and how their most extensive subsidiary concern – phosphate mining –
fits into the region.9

Phosphate mining and the fertilizer industry
The fertilizer industry as a whole encompassed the producers of fertilizer materials, the
brokers and sellers who distributed those materials and the mixers and sellers of those materials.
The fertilizer industry proper refers, primarily, to those companies that mixed and sold the
fertilizer (referred to as “mixed fertilizer manufacturers”); but, as will be seen, these companies
increasingly began to absorb the former two steps of the process into their own business
structure. These corporations – the largest domestic corporations being International Agricultural
Co. (IAC), American Agricultural Co. (AACC) and the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. – were
the foremost examples of “mixed fertilizer” producers and sellers.10 The three named companies
were the upper tier of the “Big Six” fertilizer manufacturers, which dominated the fertilizer
industry to a remarkable degree.11 In 1916, they produced 58% of the total mixed fertilizer
manufactured, in 1922, 65%.12 As mentioned, the mixed fertilizer industry can be considered as a
part of the chemical industry or the minerals industry, depending on the vantage from which it is
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seen. At the point of sale, fertilizer is considered a chemical product, but, prior to the production
of the fertilizer for sale, the larger fertilizer manufacturers were heavily engaged in the
production, buying and excavation of mineral resources – the most prominent of them being
phosphate.
The overwhelming majority of phosphate that was mined was sold to companies within
the fertilizer industry, domestic and foreign.13 In producing mixed fertilizer, there were three
main elements: nitrogen, phosphorous and potash.14 Of them, it was phosphorous, in the form of
acid phosphate, which made up the majority of the fertilizing nutrient that was applied to crops.15
Acid phosphate was formed by applying sulfuric acid to phosphate rock in a large chamber.16
The largest share of phosphate rock mined was bought by fertilizer manufactures, either via
brokers, on the market or purchased internally by a manufacturer owning a mining company to
be used in the production of acid phosphate.17 Phosphate rock, then, provided the most essential
part of the most essential ingredient in mixed fertilizer. That the fertilizer industry should take in
interest in phosphate mining is of little surprise.18
The fertilizer industry became intimately connected with the phosphate mining industry
shortly after the birth of the latter; some of the first mining companies were also fertilizer
manufacturers. This relationship can be more explicitly drawn. The names of the mine operators
brought before the National War Labor Board in 1918 included of all of the major companies in
the pebble mining industry.19 The eleven mine operators from the NWLB hearings were as
FTC, “Report…” (1916), 86, 94.
Markham, The Fertilizer Industry, 26.
15
FTC, “Report…” (1916), 94.
16
Ibid,, 90.
17
Ibid., 94-95.
18
FTC (1923), 25
19
Docket 680, Record Group 2, Records of the National War Labor Board, National Archives, College Park,
Maryland, 1-2.
13
14

73

follows: American Cyanamid Co., Lakeland Phosphate Co., Phosphate Mining Co., Swift & Co.,
The Florida Phosphate Mining Co., Coronet Phosphate Co., Palmetto Phosphate Co., American
Agricultural and Chemical Co., the Armour Fertilizer Works, International Agricultural
Corporation, Charleston Mining and Manufacturing Co.
Although the exact companies operating differed slightly in the decade before and after
1918, the list is representative of the industry in its maturity. Once the initial period of
consolidation had occurred, the companies operating remained largely consistent, and changes
were rarely the result of new investors, but rather of combinations of firms at the level of the
fertilizer manufacturer. Or in some cases, the clarification that “different” companies were, in
fact, owned subsidiaries of the same fertilizer manufacturer. Therefore, the list is representative
in another way: representative of the, at times baldly, deceptive branding practices that persisted
even after an initial investigation by the Federal Trade Commission. Of those companies: the
Palmetto Phosphate Co. of Nichols is a subsidiary of the American Agricultural Chemical Co.;
The Florida Phosphate Mining Co. is a subsidiary of F. S. Royster Guano Co.; The Phosphate
Mining Co. is a subsidiary of Peters, White & Co., and, most notably, the Charleston Mining and
Manufacturing Co. is the main phosphate arm of the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co.20 Swift &
Co., although listed by that name, also operated as the State Phosphate Co.21 As well as the
mining companies that were operated as differently named subsidiaries, the American Cyanamid
Co., Swift & Co., the American Agricultural and Chemical Co. (hereafter AACC) and the
International Agricultural Co. (hereafter IAC) operated under their own names and were large
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vertically integrated fertilizer manufacturers headquartered outside of Florida, the phosphate
mining operations of which are only one aspect of their business.
This adequately demonstrates the extent to which phosphate mining was dominated by
the mixed fertilizer manufacturers. Of the “Big Six” fertilizer manufacturers, every one of them
is represented. And of the mining the companies listed, the largest mining operations were those
possessed by the IAC, AACC and Virginia-Charleston Chemical Co. (hereafter VCC), who
collectively mined hundreds of thousands of acres of Florida’s phosphate fields.22 The
concentration in the field only intensified after this point – by 1928, only eight companies were
actively mining land pebble.23
With the primary companies identified, the industries can be organized thematically,
drawing on the interpretive categories developed by Chandler and by historians writing in his
wake, particularly Naomi Lamoreaux and Glenn Porter.24 Chandler pays only brief attention to
the industry in The Visible Hand; but, in an earlier, and equally seminal essay, “The Beginnings
of ‘Big Business’ in American History,” the mixed fertilizer industry is singled out briefly but
specifically to demonstrate his theses on modern business organization.25 In particular, Chandler
notes that the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. and the American Agricultural Chemical
Company are central examples of the four trends he identifies as typical of modern business
organization, “integration, combination, diversification, administration.”26 He goes on to note of
modern industry that “combination” (or horizontal integration) is followed by vertical
22
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integration. VCC follows this trend exactly – consolidating in the 1890s, the corporation then
turns toward investing in phosphate mining; and its “major competitor,” AACC, does the same.27
Without deviating much from the lines drawn by Chandler, modern industry can be
typified by both consolidation or horizontal integration and vertical integration (including scope
of distribution and capital requirements). It is fruitful to add to this, contra Chandler, certain
patterns of competition that persisted despite integration and subsequent cartelization as a
response to this competition. Within each of these typically modern aspects of modern industry,
the fertilizer industry and its subsidiary phosphate mining companies can be seen not to lag at all
behind any of the characteristic industries examined in The Visible Hand.28 Alongside these
categories, there are two narrative trends that emerged as the industry matured: an early period of
horizontal integration was followed by a period of vertical integration; and a period of
competition followed by a period of collusion and cartelization. These two broad trends do
overlap, but not exactly. Periods of the most extensive competition occurred after the
consolidations of the "great merger movement" took place in the early years of the century, and
competition between these massive firms still prevailed.
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Consolidation
In the pattern identified by Chandler, consolidation preceded vertical integration. This
held true in the fertilizer and phosphate industries. The first half of this pattern, horizontal
integration, is given its canonical historiographic expression in Lamoreaux’s work The Great
Merger Movement. Lamoreaux distinguishes a period spanning the last decade of the 1800s to
the first decade of the new century as characterized by a particular form of capitalist competition,
which resulted in the expansion of firms by way of mergers or consolidations occurring within
an industry.29 Her argument provided a counterpoint to Chandler’s picture of industries which
had integrated away competitive pressures; instead, consolidation resulted from intensely
competitive conditions characterized by overproduction, falling profitability rates and high
capital requirements. She also looked to young, capital-intensive industries, rather than mature
industries; the latter are more prone to vertical integration. In all respects, the early phosphate
mining industry exemplifies Lamoreaux’s argument; not only does it fit the time frame (although
it matures a few years later than the industries she examines), it experienced the exact pattern of
speculative fervor followed by sharp declines in profitability; followed by consolidation, and,
finally, stabilization at a lower rate of profit.
Consolidation within the early mining industry was a well-observed fact; it was,
moreover, a celebrated fact, by industry and government observers.30 Horizontal integration
occurred both in the phosphate mining industry and in the fertilizer industry; but it is the former
which more completely demonstrates Lamoreaux's theses. But, to some extent, divorcing the
horizontal integration of the mining companies from the vertical integration of the large fertilizer
29
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firms is misleading. In many cases, horizontal integration at the level of mining companies was
followed by vertical integration at the level of the fertilizer corporation.31
Among mining companies, the move toward consolidation came fast and early. Mining
began in the rivers and fields of central Florida in the early 1890s; the speculative rush to enter
the fields was intense.32 The early investors possessed widely varying amounts of capital; some
of them immediately began constructing plants, some investors never touched shovel to dirt.33
Within the first five years, prices for phosphate rock had almost completely collapsed. By 1897,
the industry had entered into what one observer called a “severe depression.”34 What it led to
was a tremendous shakeout of the industry. In 1890 there were 252 mining interests prospecting
and investing in land.35 This corresponds quite neatly with Lamoreaux’s characterization of early
speculation.36 By 1897, there were only 28 mining companies still in operation.37 The number of
firms being operated in Florida remained around this level, with a slow decline over the
following ten years.
From 28 companies in 1897 to the stabilized dozen that remained by 1918 was not nearly
so steep a drop off as occurred in the first years of the industry. But this is hardly surprising.
Again, following the model discerned by Lamoreaux, an early, speculative industry will collapse
into stability very quickly. This was accompanied by the severe depression of prices that
characterizes overproduction is something that would continue to haunt the industry. The slow
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decline from 28 operators to a dozen can be seen in hard rock and in land pebble. Mine operators
desired to absorb as much land and fixed capital as possible. This can be seen, for example, by
the early acquisition of concerns and land along the Peace River by the Peace River Consolidated
Phosphate Company.38 This openly consolidated company also acquired miles of railway built
along their site.39 This acquisition and building of transportation facilities was another step in
consolidation. A telling example of early horizontal consolidation came in 1903: there were eight
plants actively mining land pebble in Florida; that same year, a Joseph Hull of Savanna
consolidated four of the large mining companies: Prairie Pebble Phopshate Co., Phosphoria
Phosphate Co., Florida Engineering Co. and Land Pebble Phosphate Co., a “major part” of the
Florida land pebble trade.40 In one move, Hull acquired a sizable portion of the industry.
Specific data on the smaller concerns that were bought out or consolidated is more
difficult to place definitively, for the simple reason that a reliable, annual listing of the
companies in operation in the region would not be undertaken until 1909, by the Florida State
Geological Survey.41 Even then, although the industry had become relatively stable, discerning
patterns is complicated by the fact that the geologist rarely reported on consolidations. Observers
of the industry found little they more enjoyed discussing than consolidation, although they gave
specifics only occasionally. Joseph Struthers of the USGS wrote in unequivocal praise of “the
application of modern business methods” in the industry, by which he meant that “larger mining
companies have purchased additional property” and, notably, that they had begun to make an
effort “through combination of interests to establish a uniform price and eliminate
38
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competition.”42 This was hardly an isolated comment, and cannot be taken simply as apologia for
monopoly. The industry’s prices had plummeted to such an extent that production was at times
more costly than it was profitable.43 Heading the annual reports for the following years, “the
tendency toward consolidation” recurred as this tendency remained unabated.44 Writing in 1902,
“in general there appears to be a tendency toward a combination of the larger producers and the
gradual absorption of the smaller mines by the larger operators.”45 In 1903, remarking on the
status of the industry, it was noted that “the foremost feature is the centralization of control in a
few hands of the larger hard-rock and land pebble mines, either by direct purchase or
consolidation agreement.”46 Later in his report, the author described it as “consolidation fever.”47
More specifics can be found slightly later. In the 1910s, the most significant
consolidations occurred when the American Phosphate Mining Co. bought the plants and land
associated with the Pebbledale Phosphate Company, the Pierce Phosphate Company in Pierce
and the Peace River Phosphate Company.48 Pebbledale and Pierce had been visible names within
the industry until that point, and their consolidation under one title was notable. But this
consolidation appeared distinct from what was identified as the primary trend in the early years
of the industry; it was a “horizontal” integration in that it consolidated firms operating in direct
competition of each other, on the same material, with the same methods. However, what went
little noted until required by the Federal Trade Commission, was that this “horizontal”

Joseph Struthers, “Phosphate Rock” in Mineral Resources of the United States in 1901 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1902), 811.
43
Federal Trade Commission Decisions: Findings, Orders and Stipulations (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1946), 593.
44
This line can be seen in the 1901, 1902, 1903 USGS reports.
45
C. G. Memminger, “Phosphate Mining Industry of the United States During 1902,” in The Mineral Industry
During 1902 (New York: The Engineering and Mining Journal), 520.
46
Ibid., 521-522.
47
Ibid.
48
FTC, “Report” (1916), 199.
42

80

consolidation was, simultaneously, a vertical acquisition: the Florida Phosphate Mining
Company was an owned subsidiary of AACC.49 Likewise, in 1910, IAC bought the phosphate
land (40,000 acres in total) and capital stock owned by two exceedingly large firms, the Prairie
Pebble Phosphate Co. and the Florida Mining Co.50
Consolidation was hardly confined to the mining industry; it was as common among
fertilizer manufacturers in the same period. But as fertilizer manufacturing was a more mature
industry and less prone to the speculative depressions of phosphate mining, it did appear in a
different form. Among fertilizer manufacturers, the move toward horizontal consolidation was
exemplified by the two largest companies, both of which began extravagantly. The largest of the
fertilizer manufactures, the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. made its first appearance in South
Carolina in 1901 – it was the result of the consolidation of “something like 39” fertilizer
manufacturers.51 The FTC report went on to say that prior to 1903, VCC had acquired “nearly
all” of the independent fertilizer concerns in the Southern states of South Carolina, Georgia and
Alabama.52 The AACC began similarly auspiciously. In 1899, it was formed by consolidating the
property and capital stock of about three dozen fertilizer manufactures, which made it, alongside
VCC, the largest fertilizer manufacturer in the country.53
After the period of initial consolidation, the fertilizer mixing manufactures continued to
consolidate and buy other fertilizer manufacturers and mixing plants. Interestingly, both AACC
and VCC name the first company to attempt to integrate small dry-mixing plants and sellers as
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the International Agricultural Corporation.54 Both VCC and AACC claim that, given the
competitive acquisitions of the IAC, it was indeed “necessary” that they begin to operate
similarly. But it would make sense to see IAC vigorously pursuing such a policy against its
rivals. The IAC was, comparatively, a more recently organized corporation.55 Although, by 1916,
it had already firmly established itself as among the three largest manufacturers of the “Big Six,”
it was entering an industry already dominated by the two largest concerns. By 1914, AACC had
acquired control of more than 17 dry mixing concerns and was, until the FTC investigation,
offering the fertilizers mixed therein as separate brands.56 This was consolidation on a massive
scale. Compared to this, consolidation in the mining industry was a small affair. And in the
mining industry, by the late 1900s, the tendency had already begun to drop off. References to
centralization and consolidation were far less frequent and industry observers began to concern
themselves instead with those competitive pressures, domestic and foreign, that plagued the
industry even after consolidation.

Vertical integration
For Chandler and the historiography of American business written in his wake, there is
no phenomenon as prominent upon as vertical integration. The logic vertical integration is
simple: as firms grew, it became profitable to internalize as much of the production, distribution
and selling process as was feasible, to avoid reliance on competitors and vulnerability to market
downturns at any single point in the production process.57 Business historian Glenn Porter
discusses the drive toward vertical integration as multi-part, technological, heavy capital
54
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investment, mass-unit production; with high entry barriers due to "the capital needs, complex
costs, and competitive environments.”58
The impetus for vertical integration was especially pressing for mixed fertilizer
manufacturers.59 The mixing of fertilizer materials for sale was itself a very low-capital
enterprise. The field was saturated by fertilizer manufacturers, companies purchasing, mixing
and branding for sale fertilizer materials – the number hovered around 800 even after the
consolidation efforts of AACC and VCC.60 All that was required to mix fertilizer materials was a
shovel and screen; competition was, therefore, common, and the capital boundaries for entry into
fertilizer mixing were low.61 Although mixing could be engaged in by the farmer or general
merchant, the fertilizer manufacturers with access to large mixing plants had the distinct
advantage. As noted in the previous section, it was in the interest of fertilizer manufacturers to
purchase and operate as independent a large number of mixers.62 But even owning the largest
share of mixers, and operating them as independents could not overcome that the industry was
low-barrier. So fertilizer manufacturers began to invest in the production of the fertilizer
materials required for mixing and selling: phosphate rock, cottonseed oil, tankage, dried blood,
sulfuric acid, fish scrap. For the first fifteen years here examined, the production of potash was
not even an option for most producers, as it was controlled via state-sanctioned monopoly in
Germany.63 The strategy: by controlling the fertilizer materials at their source, larger mixed
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fertilizer manufacturers would be able to control what was available to other sellers, and thereby
price out their competitors.64
Although these manufacturers would acquire stakes in the production of nitrates and
ammoniates, it was the phosphorous component of fertilizer that was the cornerstone of this
integration. The riskiest, most capital intensive, most necessary and valuable vertical acquisition
of mixed fertilizer companies, by far, was their investment in the production of acid phosphate;
i.e., the acquisition of phosphate mining properties, methods of making sulfuric acid and plants
used to produce acid phosphate from those two materials.65 As Markham notes, nearly all
phosphate rock producers were vertically integrated, producing superphosphate and mixed
fertilizer.66
Vertical integration began among fertilizer manufacturers not long after their formation
via consolidation, but became a commonplace strategy only in the 1910s. Evidence of early
vertical integration in the region can be seen in AACC’s activity in the Peace River area. In
1903, shortly after acquiring the Peace River Phosphate Mining Co., they began to use the pebble
rock being mined almost exclusively for internal consumption – the first year of the mining
companies operation under AACC ownership produced over 65,000 tons of rock, all of which
was consumed by the company.67 An industry observer noted, “the entrance of a Northern
fertilizer combination into the phosphate mining industry was the result of a change in economic
management of its manufacturing business.”68 The AACC purchase and management of the
Florida Mining Co., and the firms consolidated within it, in 1909-1910, noted above,
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demonstrates that this change in economic management had become the standard within the
mining industry.
A number of the largest phosphate mining companies were owned subsidiaries of the Big
Six fertilizer manufacturers or of slightly smaller fertilizer manufactures (American Cyanamid),
with only a small handful operating independently (Coronet being the largest). The phosphate
land owned by these companies was tremendous, with AACC alone possessing more than
100,000 acres of phosphate deposits in Florida as of 1922; VCC and IAC both possessed
deposits nearly as large.69 It is instructive to consider the organizational structure of three of the
larger concerns, if only to demonstrate the remarkable degree of their vertical integration. In
every regard, these companies embodied the modern industrial logic characterized by Chandler
and Porter. They were highly capitalized, and organizationally distributed across the country and,
in some cases, internationally. The AACC was headquartered in New York and in 1923 was
capitalized at 36 million dollars.70
AACC’s mining companies (incorporated under the American Phosphate Mining Co.) in
1909 were worth 200,000 to 300,000 dollars in profits according to internal documents
belonging to the company.71 Between 1911 and 1912 the company invested particularly heavily
in phosphate rock mining. In the former year, its phosphate concerns were valued at 3 million,
while the following year saw them climb to 16 million.72 In 1916, the American Phosphate
Mining Co.’s capital stock was reported at more than 1.5 million.73 The AACC was also invested
in fertilizer sellers across the United States, the largest of them Coe-Mortimer and Bowker,
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rendering businesses in Detroit, but even the largest of these were less capitalized than their
phosphate mining concerns. The VCC was also heavily invested in the mining of phosphate rock,
owning the entire two million dollars of capital stock of the Charleston Mining and
Manufacturing Co., and 1914, half of the stock of the Amalgamated Phosphate Co.74 The
financial benefits of investing in phosphate mining was clear for the companies with capital
stock large enough to do so, but this integration was very capital intensive, the result of the
requirements of mining phosphate rock and producing superphosphate.
Superphosphate (or acid phosphate, the latter being the more inclusive term, referring to
any phosphate rock that has been treated with sulfuric acids) was an expensive risk due to the
production process required to make it.75 Acid phosphate, “the largest investment” in the
industry, required the production or purchase of sulfuric acid, and then the storage of that acid.76
The large chambers that the companies used to house the sulfuric acid were subject to extremely
rapid deterioration, requiring replacement every ten years.77 Moreover, the chambers required for
the production of acid phosphate cannot be shut down.78 Although fertilizer manufactures had
become heavily invested in rock mining and production, not all of the larger firms produced their
own acid phosphate. However, when the rock industry took price hits due to the chronic
overproduction and due to wartime market limitations, “at least one” company mining phosphate
after 1913 found it necessary to go into acid phosphate production; the rock they had mined
under conditions of overproduction remained unsold and would have remained so otherwise.79
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On the whole though, “it is in the production and sale of acid phosphate” that the larger
manufacturers have the largest advantage over smaller fertilizer capitals. In their control of the
phosphate deposits and of the production process for acid phosphates, these manufacturers
“practically control a natural resource” and by doing so, drive out most competition.80
Although phosphate was the most completely vertically integrated of the fertilizer
material producers, vertical integration had a larger scope phosphate mining.81 Fertilizer
manufacturers took an interest in controlling the production of other fertilizer materials and in
the mixing and distribution of the fertilizer. Armour and Swift and Co. were noted for their
investment in and production of organic ammoniates such as tankage and dried blood.82 AACC
invested in its own rendering plants near Detroit.83 VCC’s purchase of the Southern Cotton Oil
Co. was another attempt by a fertilizer manufacturer to control the production of materials.84
Integration began to encompass distribution. VCC and AACC started to buy subsidiary
fertilizer sellers, even those without their own mixing plants.85 This was part of the strategy to
acquire as many brands and “formulas” (even if identical) of mixed fertilizer as was possible.
Many of these were local, Southern sellers, who had sold brands already popular among
consumers. The clear motivation was to market these without identification that they had been
absorbed by a larger firm. Brand loyalty among farmers would ensure that this would be
profitable. This strategy also highlights another aspect of vertical integration: the idea of
spreading out risk by creating a larger distribution network.86
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Competitive pressure and cartelization
Despite the predominance of both forms of economic “integration” – which are, by
design, intended to minimize competitive pressures, establish a uniform price and to stabilize
profits – the phosphate mining industry throughout the 1910s and early 1920s remained riven by
instability. This derived, more often than not, from completive pressures that plagued the
industry and raised concern among advocates.87 The most salient form of these competitive
pressures was overproduction. Overproduction, or flooding the market with supply, resulted in
price-cutting used as a means of undercutting competition. By the 1910s, phosphate mining
industry leaders appeared to have realized that given the degree of stabilization in the mining
industry, this would have only diminished their own profits. Some overproduction appears to
have resulted from unfortunate characteristics of the demands of the fertilizer industry, including
the manner by which acid phosphate was produced (which prevented ceasing production) and the
stockpiling of rock resulting from decreases in international and domestic demand.
If centralization was the predominant topic for industry observers in the first years of the
industry, overproduction followed closely behind and, before long, overtook it. Overproduction
was reported in 1910 in the hard rock industry; the response was to sharply curtail production to
keep prices from plummeting.88 Pebble rock followed suit; 1909 was a particularly strong year
for the industry, production was ramped up to meet expected demand and the industry was
flooded with supply. By 1913, prices of phosphate rock were badly hurt by the abundance of
material available. During that year and during the first year of the war, phosphate rock was
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selling for prices below the costs of mining.89 And between 1907 and 1914, every year reported
increased tonnage of rock mined, and, just as reliably, showed a steady decline in prices. 90
Beyond mining, acid phosphate itself was prone to overproduction, and during this period,
particularly 1911, demonstrated this tendency.91
In the years after the war, overproduction and low phosphate rock prices hurt the owners
of the rock deposits. This resulted in and was exacerbated by growing back supplies of sulfuric
acid.92 In 1921, the phosphate rock prices again suffered “severe depression” (a phrase that has
been commonly encountered since the 1890s in the industry), with sales lower than any
peacetime year since 1905.93 This was attributed by government observers to the industry’s
misguided expectations of an immediate postwar recovery of demand. As a result of this
expectation mining companies ramped up production and flooded the market. As late as 1922,
the competition between the Big Six fertilizers, throughout the industry, remained “keen.”94 Still
the prices of production, mining the phosphate rock, exceeded that of the prices paid for the
rock.95 Though overproduction was not the lone cause. Markets for fertilizer remained small
during these years, which contributed to the inability of rock producers to sell their products,
raw, as acid phosphate or as mixed fertilizer.
The stabilization of phosphate rock prices that occurred, when it did occur, in the 1900s
and ‘10s, was, as mentioned above, a result of regular market forces and of shrewd planning on
the part of individual firms. But the attempt to avoid the loss of profits by not undercutting
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competitors via price-cutting did not (or did not yet) constitute deliberate collusion on domestic
prices. Both the AACC and VCC were too large for either to seriously consider that price-cutting
phosphate rock would run out of business; the presence of large firms acting as constant
competitive pressure and the desire to avoid a price collapse acted to stabilize the industry to
some extent. Although domestic prices could be stabilized, foreign prices became much more
volatile in the middle of the 1910s. The most immediate cause of this was the war, which cut off
the business of the largest buyer of hard rock phosphate, Germany. Beyond phosphate, this hurt
fertilizer manufacturers by removing what had been until that time the world’s sole producer of
potash, another common fertilizer ingredient.96
Competition in the fertilizer industry extended well beyond the tumultuous and grinding
field of phosphate mining. Cottonseed meal, familiar because of the VCC’s heavy investment in
that industry, was another market prone to overproduction, despite the VCC’s attempt to control
the production of that material. In the 1920s, this overproduction badly hurt the industry, driving
profitability down sharply.97 Prior to the 1920s, there had been localized attempts at controlling
prices within the industry, but even these proved unsuccessful. The groups met under the name
“Sons of Plato,” organized ostensibly as a social group; but market forces continued to prevail
despite the VCC’s heavy capitalization and the attempts of the industry.98 Beyond cottonseed,
phosphate or any of the individual materials, the mixed fertilizer industry itself was open to
competition from smaller mixers. As late as the 1920s, industry observers still did not find that it
was established on a “sound bases” – that is, at a sustainable level of profitability.99
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The explicit cartelization of the phosphate industry was undertaken in 1919 under the
sanction of the Webb-Pomerene Act.100 Three organizations were founded. The two for pebble
phosphate – the Phosphate Export Association and Florida Pebble Phosphate Association –
merged in 1933, though they had already been under the same management and consisted of the
same member companies.101 All of the larger mining companies were members.102 The policies
of the associations were decided jointly by a council with representatives from the member
companies. The initial impetus for cartelization was solely to control export pricing. After the
war, competition from other phosphate mines, particularly in North Africa, threatened export
profits. Not only were prices fixed, but sales were allocated and quotas determined for each of
the member companies. The export business benefited markedly from this
arrangement.103Arranging domestic prices proved more difficult. Competition from mines in
Tennessee acted to keep domestic prices lower than export prices. However, member companies
had access to internal documentation of fellow members, which allowed the control of
production levels without explicit price setting. This was the ultimate solution to the problem of
overproduction within the industry, and price wars would not erupt again in the domestic market
until 1935.104 The cartels also monopolized the use of chemical flotation for the industry by
patent and threatened suit when non-members attempted to use the method.
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Phosphate and Florida’s “New South” economy
Florida is nearly bereft of economic histories. The lone recent monograph is William
Stronge’s The Sunshine Economy. Stronge argues that the most characteristic and notable aspect
of Florida’s 20th century economy has been the growth of the “sunshine economy” and its
precedence over what he identifies as the three other aspects of Florida’s economic base (defined
as the foremost areas of economic activity within a state or region).105 The four economic bases
of Florida’s 20th century economy were the sunshine industry (tourism, seasonal vegetation), the
maritime industry (cigar manufacture, fishing), Southern agriculture and the “frontier
industry.”106 The frontier industry was the economic base that contained phosphate mining. It is
characterized as “frontier” because its productive activity was premised on unsustainable
extractive activity, similar to the extractive mining industries of the Western states. Other
activities included under this label are lumber and naval stores. Phosphate is the first industry
Stronge discusses (emphasizing its importance) and it is by a great distance the most
characteristically modern of Florida’s extractive industries. Although it trailed behind naval
stores in the 1890s, it rapidly succeeded it after the turn of the century; and it vied with lumber as
the most economically active section of the frontier economy. This is especially notable when it
is realized that the “sunshine economy” about which Stronge is writing did not come into a stable
existence until after the 1930s – so, for the entire period this thesis covers, the primary economic
base of Florida’s economy was extractive. Even by 1930, 40% of the state’s economy activity
was attributable to this frontier economy, of which phosphate made up a significant portion,
second only to lumber.107
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The traditional Southern staple crops played essentially no role in the economy of the
state during these decades. It is for this reason, and for its peripheral location, that Stronge
characterizes the Florida of the late 1880s as more Western than Southern. But this seems like a
bad abstraction. Florida shared the social characteristics (including population demographics,
legal segregation) that are associated with the Jim Crow south and its extractive industries,
especially phosphate, turn out to be integral to the South’s traditional economic crops.
The local economic benefits of the phosphate mines in Central Florida appear to have
been underwhelming. The barely livable housing provided for workers has been documented.
These mining camps and the small towns near them (such as Mulberry) did not receive enough
from the mine operators to be invested in sustained local growth. The towns never became urban
centers like Birmingham, but lingered as extractive outposts for decades. Florida itself performed
little better, sharing with the rest of the South its poverty. The most noteworthy economic event
for the state in the 1920s was a real estate boom, a fury of land speculation that amounted to little
real development. Phosphate mining, the most modern part of a modern industry, offered little
more to the local region than barely sustainable wage labor.
Phosphate mining was a high capital, low profit part of an already fairly low profit
industry; the production of acid phosphate (or superphosphates) from mined phosphate rock was
capital intensive and tended to result in overproduction crises. That such an industry would
encounter difficulties with and, as far as possible, resist organization by, labor, becomes clear;
that they would resist increases in productive capacity until it was certain that such increases
wouldn’t result in only greater overproduction and loss of profitability is also clear.

93

For a number of scholars, industrialization is central to their understanding of the New
South.108 The field bifurcates along the lines of those who take the limited industrialization that
the region did see as evidence of something genuinely capitalist and modern and those who resist
this characterization as overly optimistic, and instead stress that continuity with an Old South.109
The latter approach is taken by Howard Rabniowitz, who is deeply skeptical that the South was,
in 1920, any more modern than it had been in the postbellum period: he cites the reliance on
agriculture and the incapacity of the region to diversify its economy, the absence of urbanization
and the sporadic industrialization.110 This is as close to a canonical statement of a South that had
resisted, or avoided, modernization as one can hope for, but postbellum Southern historian Scott
Marler goes further, suggesting that until the New Deal, Southern business was so reliant on
mercantile structures and cotton that it did not become fully capitalist until the New Deal
period.111 David Carlton offers the canonical statement of a modern, fully capitalist New South,
in his essay “The Revolution From Above.”112
Against the idea that the regional economy can be characterized as a whole as backward
or modern, Carlton and Coclanis offer another, more potent conceptual tool. The very means of
modernization were, at the same time, means by which areas remained underdeveloped.
Development and poverty not only existed side by side, but development (and modernization)
often exacerbated poverty. The framework of “unbalanced growth” is illuminating for both the
108
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phosphate industry's place within the Florida and the fertilizer industry’s place within the
regional economy of the New South.113 The principal buyers of the fertilizer industry's finished
goods (mixed fertilizers) were the Southeastern states of South Carolina, North Carolina,
Alabama, Virginia. They purchased the fertilizer made from Florida’s phosphate rock to treat
their traditionally Southern crops, especially cotton.114 So it was the product of a distinctly
modern industry that enabled and prolonged the agricultural production of the traditional
southern crops. It was precisely by means of this modern industry that southern farming practices
associated with the most repressive and “feudal” characteristics of the South, such as crop liens
and sharecropping.115
“Unbalanced growth” refuses the pieties of the equilibrium model of economic growth,
instead seeking to understand how markets can reinforce disparities.116 This occurs at different
economic scales, from local and regional to global. A highly capitalized core polarizes the
surrounding economic areas, drawing resources from them and inhibiting local competition. This
becomes a feedback loop, reinforcing the economic dominance of the core. This strongly
resembles the concept of “uneven development,” developed within Marxist economics and
geography. Geographer Neil Smith ties the patterns identified by Carlton to the logic of capital
accumulation, which benefits from the polarization created. Capital comes to remake the world
113
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in its image. Smith writes, “uneven development is social inequality blazoned into the
geographical landscape, and it is simultaneously the exploitation of that geographical unevenness
for certain socially determined ends.”117
The fertilizer manufacturers themselves played no small role in the misery and
indebtedness of Southern farmers and sharecroppers. Fertilizer manufacturers operated a credit
system which wracked Southern farmers throughout the period.118 In 1916, for example, the
percentage of fertilizers bought by Southern farmers on credit – credit provided by the
manufacturers – was between 80% and 90%.119 The FTC described these loans and the
conditions of indebtedness of Southern farmers as “incredibly bad.”120 Although these numbers
decreased slightly, they did so only when fertilizer manufacturers were unable to provide the
credit and farmers had to either find the necessary cash or go without. Fertilizer manufacturers
also engaged in knowingly deceptive selling practices, disguising brands and operating
subsidiaries.121 Prior to 1916, it was common practice for the fertilizer manufacturers to buy out
local sellers but retain their brand and mixtures – profiting, but without alerting the costumer of
the new ownership. These deceptive selling were decried by the FTC. Manufacturers marketed
hundreds of brands whose nutrient ingredients were essentially identical.
Fertilizer manufacturers also aimed to prevent farmers from being able to produce their
own fertilizer at an individual level, by pricing fertilizer materials purchased at an individual
scale deeply outside of the farmers’ reach, by making wholesale amounts (which were priced
more affordably) large beyond the manufacturing scope of the individual farmer (thus, intended
117

Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 3rd edition (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 2010), 154, 206.
118
FTC, “Report,” (1923), 43.
119
Ibid.
120
FTC, “Report” (1916), 237.
121
Ibid., XVIII.

96

exclusively for industry consumption).122 Because local and small scale dry-mixing posed the
greatest threat to the fertilizer industry at the level of the manufacturers, it was in the interest of
producers to ensure that there would be no competition at that point.123 Because the largest
fertilizer manufacturers had vertically integrated to include the production of fertilizer materials
(far beyond the reach of the individual farmer) they had a created a de facto cartel for controlling
the wholesale of that material.
This discrepancy between individual and wholesale prices brings us precisely to the point
at which the more abstract economic concerns of the fertilizer industry’s operations – its
integration, its capital investment, and its cartelization – meet up with concrete historical
concerns of the New South: its poverty and backwardness, credit systems, sharecropping,
residual “feudal” or pre-capitalist elements. The fertilizer industry (one need only consider that
the VCC was headquartered in Richmond) and phosphate mining industries were Southern, yet
simultaneously as modern as any big business in the North. But the most distinctively modern of
industries not only can coexist with but can create the most distinctively unmodern conditions –
as clear a picture of uneven development as can be drawn.
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CONCLUSION
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NEW SOUTH
The concept of the “New South” began, essentially, as an advertising slogan.1 By
fostering an image of national unity and regional political stability, the aim of early promoters of
the concept was to draw in Northern capital in the decades following Reconstruction, and to
provide an ideological salve to a region still reeling from the economic devastation of the war.
The concept has been, from its inception, almost deliberately vague, giving it the ability to
encompass a number of conflicts and contradictions. The first of these was the projection by
boosters of an image of peaceful racial cohesion, which existed alongside actually white racial
violence and segregation; boosters argued for economic change that encompassed
industrialization and modernization, but this was accompanied by the seemingly backwards
agricultural practices used after emancipation, such as sharecropping. Within the historiography
of the New South, these themes of racial exclusion and domination come to the fore in
discussions of the region’s modernity. Economic modernization relied on segregation and white
supremacy, and the converse is also true: the forms of segregation and white supremacy taken
during the New South were specifically modern, reliant on urbanization, monopolization of large
industries, and a burgeoning consumer culture.2 If slavery denied black Southerners the fruits of
their labor, the decades following Reconstruction saw them determined to regain them; and white
capital was equally determined to again deprive them under new forms of domination.3
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It is not that the New South, as a creature of capitalist modernity, became indistinct from
the rest of the nation. On the contrary, the contradictions of the New South were in many ways
unique, or acute forms of the most difficult aspects of modernization. In stressing its
distinctiveness, Woodward emphasizes the role of economic modernization with the
exclusionary political regimes of the region; he does not even hesitate to find difficulties at the
heart of the Southern populists, noting that white democratic sentiment often coincided with
heightened levels racial violence, and that both populism and repression were predicated on the
creation of new labor markets and a black “reserve army of labor.”4 Woodward and Gaston both
stress the role that economic development, and specifically the desire for capital investment,
rested behind much booster rhetoric of a resource rich “Opulent South” of cheap and pliant
labor.5 Tindall gave these themes an even fuller expression, refusing to shy away from the fact
that through the 1920s, “Atlanta spirit” boosterism coincided and relied on the cheap labor
markets and wage differentials that were created by a perpetually impoverished agriculture and
with increasing amounts of tenancy and sharecropping.6 Integration into national markets
coincided with the rise of “the Savage Ideal,” the violent regionalist and nativist racial ideology
enforced throughout the decade.7

New South Florida, New South Capitalism
With the phosphate industry the myths and savage ideals of the New South found a
striking realization. Florida’s phosphate fields were a rich natural resource, a far more plentiful
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deposit than those that had been mined decades earlier in South Carolina.8 Labor was bought
cheaply and remained until the First World War, unorganized. The mining of phosphate rock
produced a fertilizer that was widely sold throughout the South, and became essential for the
Southern staple crops contributing to King Cotton and the chronic difficulties of Southern
agriculture. The mining of phosphate was premised not on the needs of the region, its farmers, or
the mine laborers, but on maintaining the strained profitability of an industry that controlled
access to these resources. The productivity of the industry was parasitic on its profitability,
which in turn faced difficulty with vicious, early industry competition, before stabilizing with the
industry’s ability after the First World War to control the distribution and pricing of the
phosphate and fertilizer through open collusion.9 This is characteristic of industrial capitalism,
which subordinates production to forms of economic imperatives deriving from the real
competition between capitals; between labor and capital (the demand for wages and fewer hours
on the one hand, and the attempted control of the labor process by technologically increasing
working efficiency on the other) and between differing industries and actors on a broader world
market.
The phosphate industry stood at the center of these conflicts, taking part in them and
exemplifying them at their most acute. The industry stood at the forefront of modern industrial
consolidation at the same time as it enacted segregation in its camps and workforce. Its
consolidation into the fertilizer industry provided latter with a crucial component that was then
sold to Southern farmers and sharecroppers using deceptive labeling and priced out mid-level
competition by integrating the production of fertilizer materials.
8
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Labor enters this picture of economic competition and control as “pliant” and cheap.
Prior to the First World War, union organization in the district had been all but impossible.10
Even after the union became a presence, meetings were held in secret and employment
discrimination was the norm. The dire conditions of the mining camps, particularly the company
housing, were plainly the product of Jim Crow segregation. For black workers, as elsewhere in
the south, lynching was a looming threat, and Blakey cites “numerous examples of their being
hanged, burned at the stake and even drawn and quartered.”11 The first legal execution in Polk
County was the hanging in Bartow of a black phosphate worker.12 The conditions on the job
were examined in the first chapter: workers, particularly the unskilled black laborers, were
exposed to the harshest conditions, which in the pits were “malaria-infested” and swampy and in
the dry bins, unbearably hot.13 Ultimately, the social and economic contradictions of modernity
played out on the bodies of the workers in the mines. And as the workers struck in 1919, MineMill President Charles Moyer wrote, “no strike has ever been more fully justified than the strike
of the Florida Phosphate Workers.”14
This thesis has argued that an understanding of Florida’s phosphate mines demands the
placement of the state and the industry within the context of the New South, and within
modernity. I have also argued for a specific concept of modernity, which views the violence and
conflict of these decades not as aberrations from a stable process of rationalization, but as
intrinsic to the process itself. When modernity came to the South it manifested in a particularly
“Report of International President Moyer,” Official Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Consecutive and Third
Biennial Convention of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Denver: Union of Mine, Mill
and Smelter Workers, 1918), 30.
11
Blakey, Florida Phosphate Industry, 53.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
“Strike of Florida Phosphate Workers,” in Official Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Consecutive and Fourth
Biennial Convention of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Denver: Union of Mine, Mill
and Smelter Workers, 1920), 134.
10

101

savage way, due not to the region’s “backwardness,” but to its adherence to this strange,
conflictual logic.15 I have done so by examining the industry from three, interrelated
perspectives, at increasing scales of generality: the characteristic New South difficulties of race
and labor are displayed in full force in the first chapter; the fitful adoption of technology and the
ferocity of capitalist competition in the second chapter; and the mixture of tremendous outside
capital and vertically integrated industry coinciding and regional, rural impoverishment in the
third.
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